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Abstract
The free flow of global capital has been accompanied by destabilizing fi-
nancial crises, coupled with significant redistributive effects. However,
the existing literature has not adequately addressed the channels for this
redistribution, nor the different factors that influence the formation of
post-crisis redistributive policy. This paper develops a theoretical model
that captures the influence of domestic special interest lobbying and in-
ternational bilateral bargaining on the formation of equilibrium lending,
bailout, and reallocation decisions. The paper then takes the theoretical
model to the data, testing two key predictions of the model using both
micro- and macro-level datasets. Finally, implications for international
financial reform are examined in light of the model’s findings.
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Will much impeach the justice of his state;
Since that the trade and profit of the city
Consisteth of all nations. Therefore, go:
These griefs and losses have so bated me,
That I shall hardly spare a pound of flesh
To-morrow to my bloody creditor.
The Merchant of Venice III. iii. 32–37 (William Shakespeare)
1 Introduction
The banking and financial crises in emerging markets at the end of the 1990s and
early 21st century are a potent reminder of the complications that accompany
global capital flows. On one hand, this free flow of capital is generally consid-
ered a desirable goal, since it ensures that the best investment opportunities are
supported. Such flows can foster greater economic growth and living standards
in developing countries—where domestic capital is often in short supply—while
providing attractive investment vehicles for developed countries. On the other,
capital flows may have destabilizing effects, especially when their sudden out-
flow manifest financial crises, which in turn lead to economic hardship, espe-
cially among the poor. These deleterious effects appear to be the prima facie
justification for the existence of international financial institutions.
The resolution of financial crises present their own unique set of problems,
and are a reminder of the fragile relationship between international bank lend-
ing, developing country borrowing, and IMF intermediation. First, financial
crises typically lead to significant redistributive effects, both at macroeconomic
(Baldacci, de Mello Jr. & Inchauste Comboni 2002; Halac & Schmukler 2004)
as well as microeconomic levels (Frankenberg, Smith & Thomas 2003; McKenzie
2003). However, the channels for this redistribution are usually not articulated:
If there is redistribution within the developing country, does this occur purely
within the developing country, or from developing country taxpayers to devel-
oped country banks? Is there redistribution as well from developed country
taxpayers to the banking system in the developing and developed world?
Second, the dynamics of global capital flows are also complicated by the
presence of international financial institutions, such as the IMF. To begin with,
the IMF is an indisputably politically-charged institution: It is “managed by po-
litically appointed individuals from member nations, and the political interests
of its members influence its decisions” (Smith, Jr. 1984). This sets the scene for
conflicting perceptions regarding the true role of the IMF, and disputes over how
Fund programs—being subject to international politicking—may exact unneces-
sary hardship on borrowing nations, while favoring bankers and elites (Vreeland
2003; Woods 2003). The result is a transfer of wealth from developing to devel-
oped countries, implicitly sponsored by the IMF. Moreover, there is also reason
to believe that developed-country taxpayers may end up footing part of the bill.
The proportionality of country quota subscriptions effectively imply that one
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of the bearers of the low-cost IMF bailouts is the developed country taxpayer
(Stiglitz 2002).
Third, special interest lobbying may play an important role in domestic redis-
tributive politics within both developed and developing countries. This special
interest activity muddies any analysis of post-crisis redistribution, since it be-
comes difficult to disentangle the implications of domestic political positioning
from international arm-twisting. Given the redistributive effects, then, what are
the factors that come into play in the formation of post-crisis resolution policy?
Who are the players that matter, and how do they interact with one another?
The objective of this paper is to clarify the different channels and factors
that constitute the formation of post-crisis resolution policy. In particular,
it will develop and test a model that incorporates the influence of domestic
special interest lobbying and international bilateral bargaining on the formation
of equilibrium lending, bailout, and reallocation decisions, taking the crisis event
as exogenous.
We introduce a two-country open-economy model with ex ante heteroge-
neous groups in each country. The process of post-crisis resolution is modeled
as a sequential game. After the crisis occurs, borrowing and lending countries
gather—under the auspices of the IMF—to negotiate post-crisis Fund assistance.
The equilibrium amount of official lending is determined by this bargaining pro-
cess. Bargaining is treated as a timing game, where governments of both creditor
and debtor nations make decisions on whether to concede first in negotiations
by weighing the welfare loss from waiting another period to concede, versus the
expected welfare gain of waiting for this additional period.
However, in determining the relative costs and benefits, both nations take
into account the ex post heterogeneous redistribution that will result under each
plausible scenario. This redistribution is in turn dependent on a menu auction,
where special interests such as international banks and politically-connected
firms offer contributions to policymakers to influence their allocation choices.
In a developed country, these may be treated as campaign contributions; in
developing countries, these are more likely to be in the form of bribes and other
nonpecuniary benefits to politicians. The redistribution is then effected in the
final stage according to policymakers maximizing a weighted average of general
welfare and special-interest contributions.
Our theoretical model predicts that the post-crisis consumption of groups
in the economy is dependent on, inter alia, whether the group was politically
organized: The crisis changes the power structure of groups in the country and
allows certain ones to take advantage of their relationship with policymakers to
extract a larger part of the bailout pie. We also predict that, in equilibrium,
lending decisions by developed countries—through the medium of the IMF—
take into consideration both the likely post-crisis redistribution outcomes, as
well as any political capital accruing to policymakers for not giving in to the
the other country. Taking the model to the data, we find support for these
hypotheses. In particular, using household-level data, we find that political
organization exerts a statistically significant impact on changes in consumption
after a financial crisis. Similarly, IMF lending patterns suggest that political
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economy considerations may be important in the determination of actual loan
packages disbursed.
The idea that international banks take collective action to secure interna-
tional interests is not novel. De Grauwe & Fratianni (1984, p. 168) argued after
the 1982 Latin debt crisis that U.S. banks had strong incentives to “engage in
collective action aimed at shifting their losses onto the rest of society.” In a
more recent vein, Tirole (2003) applies a dual- and common-agency framework
that captures how political economy considerations in redistributive politics may
influence the exchange rate, debt holdings, and capital account liberalization.
However, the paper is not primarily concerned with post-crisis resolution and
redistribution. A paper by Jeanne & Zettlemeyer (2001) also tries to capture
the dynamics underlying the domestic politics of bailouts, but the motivation
underlying a bailout is assumed rather than modeled, and the international
dimension is not captured at all.
The heterogeneity of interests has also been a feature in studies of opti-
mal delay in policy formation (Alesina & Drazen 1991; Perraudin & Sibert
2000). However, the former paper leaves the international dimension largely
unexplored, while the latter model does not place negotiations in the domes-
tic context—both of which are achieved in this paper. Finally, the impact of
institutional arrangements on international lending has also been considered in
the literature; for example, Plaut & Melnik (2003) consider the complexities
inherent in the institutional features that characterize IMF lending; however,
their paper is focused on different forms of IMF financing, rather than its role
in crisis management.
The contribution of this research is threefold. First, the theoretical model
brings together two hitherto disparate strands of the literature: The new polit-
ical economy literature, and the new open economy macroeconomics literature.
It therefore places arguments on the political economy of financial crisis res-
olution (Haggard 2000) and IMF lending decisions (Bird & Rolands 2003) on
firm methodological footing. The payoff to this approach is that it allows us to
address some of the existing puzzles in the literature, such as how political risk
may help explain the Lucas (1990) paradox and home market bias, as well as
reconciling two competing explanations of the Tullock (1972) puzzle of apparent
underinvestment in rent-seeking activity.
Second, the empirical analyses extend the frontiers of the existing empirical
literature, by incorporating political-economic factors as explanatory variables
in examining the heterogeneous outcomes of financial crises and IMF lending. In
contrast to existing work, we motivate our economic and political factors directly
from a theoretical model. Third, the model also provides guidance on how
international institutions may be reformed in the light of financial globalization,
in response to challenges by, inter alia, Calomiris (2003), Grant & Keohane
(2005), and Stiglitz (2002). As such, it informs the policy debate over the role
of such institutions in the globalization process.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we detail some
features of post-financial crisis resolution. This is followed by an exposition of
the formal model (Section 3). Section 4 will take a look at the empirical evidence.
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Two final sections conclude with some reflections on potential international
policy reform, and areas for future research.
2 Features of Post-Crisis Resolution
This section will present some features that characterize the process of post-crisis
resolution. In particular, it focuses on the influence of global banks in lending
nations, corporate conglomerates and domestic banks in debtor nations, and the
intermediation role of the IMF. We wish to present four important features: The
involvement of international financial institutions, political-economic pressures
that undergird the bargaining process with respect to official loan packages, the
strong private-public sector relationships in debtor and creditor countries, and
the heterogeneous redistributive outcome of these crises.1
First, international financial institutions, especially the IMF, were often ac-
tively and intimately involved in post-crisis management, which included official
lending as well as technical assistance with associated conditionalities. In the
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, the Fund disbursed, alto-
gether, USD $36 billion during the period to the crisis-hit countries of Indone-
sia, Korea, and Thailand, through its Emergency Financing Mechanism and the
newly-created Supplemental Reserve Facility. While the Fund does not reveal
the specific source of stand-by credit for each instance of lending, these are gen-
erally drawn from quota subscriptions, the bulk of which are from developed
countries—with the United States, Japan, and Germany contributing slightly
over 30% of total quotas. Furthermore, the IMF also convened meetings for in-
terested (developed) countries to assist in filling the financing gap. For example,
the IMF received pledges of bilateral lending from Japan (USD $4 billion) and
Australia (USD $1 billion) to Thailand (International Monetary Fund 1997).
The final bill for these three countries eventually came up to USD $95 billion.
The IMF was thus very much an active conduit for official capital flows from
developed countries to the crisis-hit developing economies.
Second, the bargaining process, as well as the agreed loan packages, often
reflected not just economic bases, but political-economy considerations as well.
Bargaining occurred between governments and was often in the context of the
larger concerns of their constituents, with the Fund serving more as a forum
for these workouts, as opposed to an involved actor. For the Argentine crisis in
2001/02, it was clear that official debt negotiations under the IMF, as well as ac-
tual Fund disbursements, were subject to the complicity and support of the U.S.
Treasury. The factor was certainly strong enough to have potentially overruled
prudence as the crisis deepened, leading two Directors of the Executive Board
to abstain from voting for the September 2001 package (De Beaufort Wijnholds
2003). As a matter of fact, then-Economy Minister Cavallo goes as far as to
claim that “what Argentina needed and expected from the US government was
1In a separate document—available on the author’s website—we argue these features in
much fuller detail in the context of two case studies: The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98,
and the Argentinean crisis of 2001/02.
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political support for an orderly process of debt restructuring” (Cavallo 2004,
p. 143), and that the failure of the second Bush administration in providing
this support eventually led to the suspension of disbursements by the IMF in
December 2001.
Packages also often demonstrated the reality of political pressures inherent
in accepting IMF money. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997/98, the
Korean national press described the act as a “national shame.” Kim Dae-Jung—
then the opposition presidential candidate—went as far as to call December 3,
1997, the day the IMF and Korean government finalized negotiations over a USD
$57 billion loan, “National Economic Humiliation Day” (JoongAng Ilbo 1997).
Similarly, Indonesia’s then-president Suharto engaged in several confrontations
with the IMF and the Clinton Administration (South China Morning Post 1998).
Indeed, Malaysia’s explicit rejection of any IMF assistance was premised in part
on a view that the political costs of doing so would be too great, conspiracy
theories involving Soros aside (Woo 1999).2 During the Bulgarian twin crises of
1996/97, democratic elements in the form of “strikes, mass demonstrations, and
round-the-clock student protests” led to the removal of the former communist
government, and ushered in the eventual closure of negotiations (Genev 1997, p.
126). And Brazil’s acquiescence to the IMF’s policy recommendations during its
crisis in 1999 was made not so much as to placate the Fund, but mainly because
its then-President Cardoso was responding to wider political pressures from the
populace (Economist 1999). Overall, official loan negotiations appear to be
tightly constrained by governments needing to take into account the preferred
positions of their constituents, more so than any IMF stance per se (Blustein
2001, 2005). In crisis economies, the widely-held view was that IMF plans were
“replays of policies that [developed countries had] been trying to get [develop-
ing countries] to adopt,” which was “an abuse of IMF power. . . at a time of
weakness” (Feldstein 1998, p. 32).
Third, cozy relationships typically existed between the private and public
sector in crisis countries. Indeed, the pervasiveness of special interest politicking
in these countries often gave rise to the charge of “crony capitalism.” Even
with ostensible changes in the post-crisis power structure, private economic
power remained relatively concentrated—often in a few family-owned business
groups (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes & Shleifer 1999)—which made the economic
environment well suited for political rent-seeking.3 Thus, when combined with
2In particular, given the power struggle at the time between prime minister Mahathir Mo-
hammed and his designated successor, Anwar Ibrahim, unilaterally imposing capital controls
ensured that the political support that Mahathir enjoyed from powerful groups within UMNO
would remain intact in the event of Anwar’s expulsion from the cabinet. Indeed, capital con-
trols were implemented on the eve of Anwar’s firing; had Mahathir not done so, the ensuing
capital flight would meant recourse to the IMF for support, a position that would have been
highly unpopular.
3While there is no direct linkage from oligarchic family control to political rent-seeking,
there are good reasons to believe that rent-seeking is easier in such economic environments.
Since controlling shareholders can exercise a disproportionate amount of power in firm de-
cisionmaking processes, political favors—such as bribes—may be easier to effect, and coop-
erative rent-seeking behavior becomes easier to sustain. As Morck & Yeung (2004, p. 403)
assert, “oligarchic families plausibly have an innate advantage as political rent seekers. . . [they
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the potentially corrupt bureaucracies in most crisis countries, special interests
were often easily served. The crisis in Russia “shifted the balance of power
within the executive branch, weakening the oligarchs and strengthening the
‘power ministries’. . . [but the] three postcrisis prime ministers did not reverse the
course of economic and domestic policy pursued by their predecessors” (Rutland
2001, p. 257). Overall, Russian oligarchs have fared exceedingly well in the
aftermath of the ruble crisis of 1998, in no small part due to their political
connections. This, perhaps, should come as no surprise, given Russia’s firm
ownership structure and its generally rampant corruption.4
This notion of policymaker responsiveness to private sector persuasion was
by no means limited to the debtor countries. Global banks with a large exposure
to emerging markets could have influenced their respective governments in the
post-crisis episode as well. European, especially German, and Japanese banks
had high exposures to the crisis countries of East Asia, and U.S. banks were
deeply involved in those in Latin America. The threat of a wider emerging
market meltdown could have prompted these banks to seek political intervention
in the crisis. Congressional voting for international financial rescues in Mexico
in 1994 and East Asia in 1997/98 appear to have been influenced by special
interest pressures (Broz 2005).
Last, the redistribution of the loan package was typically heterogeneous. Ar-
guably, part of this was by design: Government authorities in the crisis-struck
countries had to guarantee the viability of their financial sectors to prevent
panic-induced bank runs and financial collapse. However, part of this was due
to the preexisting relationships between the governments of these countries with
private sector banks. While the ostensible objective of IMF bailout funds—
according to countries’ Letters of Intent—were for the purposes of comprehen-
sively restructuring the corporate and financial sectors through the closure of
failed firms, the reality of expeditiously doing so was complicated by the ex-
isting relationships between government and business interests. In Indonesia,
Suharto quickly took action to protect favored individuals and firms, and by
January 1998 it became evident that the administration was seeking to return
to business-as-usual: Big-ticket economic projects for connected firms were qui-
etly passed, and “crony banks consumed the bulk of the emergency liquidity
credit” (Haggard 2000, p. 67). Following the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the
Zedillo administration continued the Salinas administration’s policy of protect-
ing the banking sector, in part because “the groups most harmed by the policy
either were politically marginal or could not readily perceive the distributional
consequences” (Kessler 1998, p. 52); the result was a bailout that “rewarded the
guilty and the rich, ensuring repayment to wealthy foreign investors who had
gambled in the risky Mexican securities market at the expense of U.S. and Mex-
ican taxpayers” (Kessler 1999, p. 121). Post-crisis redistribution often favored
possess] characteristics [that] make them better able to establish and sustain the relationships
of trust with public officials that raise the returns to political rent seeking. Moreover, it is
hard to conceive of others who share these advantages.”
4Transparency International’s corruption perception index for Russia was 2.3—out of a
possible 10—for the period between 1998 and 2001.
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special interests over the general population, regardless of ex ante promises and
statements to the contrary by governments (Faccio, Masulis & McConnell 2005).
The danger of IMF bailouts acting as a wealth transfer from both devel-
oping and developed country taxpayers to international commercial banks was
thus very real. Since both private bank debt (Klingen, Weder & Zettelmeyer
2004) as well as official loans from the IMF (Rogoff 2003) were often repaid
in full—and sometimes ahead of schedule—there seems to be little doubt that,
at least for Asia, the major burden of financing these bailouts was ultimately
borne by taxpayers (Sacks & Thiel 1998).5 This reality of redistribution was
best summarized by the former president of the Banco Central de la Repu´blica
Argentina, who claimed that the crisis “transferred about 40% of private debt
to workers, who are seeing their salaries cut in half. . . [w]e are experiencing a
mega-redistribution of wealth and income unprecedented in the history of the
capitalist world” (Gaudin 2002, p. 9).
3 Analytical Framework
3.1 Consumers
Consider a world comprising two countries, a (rich) developed (h = R) and
(poor) developing (h = P) nation, each possessing Ih distinct groups of citizens,
each with mass N ih, such that
∑
iN
i
h = Nh. Each group consists of identical
members, and is assumed to possess lifetime utility given by
U
(
cih
)
= Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu
(
cih,s
)
, h = R,P, (1)
where cis is consumption of goods by group i at time s, and β is the subjective
discount rate.
Each group is able to borrow freely from international capital markets; hence,
the flow budget for each group is
bih,s+1 = (1 + r) b
i
h,s + yh,s − qh,s − cih,s + gih,s, h = R,P, (2)
where bis is private international borrowing (when negative) or lending (when
positive) by group i at time s, gis is the (nonmonetary) government disburse-
ment (or tax) for group i at time s, ys and qs are, respectively, the levels of
(random) output and investment (assumed not to differ between groups), and
cis is consumption. Debt is repaid at the (fixed) international real interest rate
r. Government disbursements are assumed to be one-time; hence, gis 6= 0 for a
particular s = t and gis = 0 thereafter.
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5It would be an oversimplification, however, to suggest that creditor-country banks were
completely unaffected by the crisis. Sturzenegger & Zettlemeyer (2005) estimate that haircuts
due to sovereign debt restructurings between 1998 and 2005 ranged between 13% and 73%.
6The natural limitation of this assumption is that we lose any fiscal dynamics from the
analysis. However, we nonetheless adopt this strategy to focus on the political-economic
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Maximization of (1) with respect to (2) yields a version of the standard
stochastic intertemporal consumption Euler:
u′
(
cih,t
)
= β (1 + r)Etu′
(
cih,t+1
)
, ∀i ∈ Ih & h = R,P. (3)
By imposing the solvency condition
lim
T→∞
(
1
1 + r
)T
bih,t+T+1 = 0, (4)
and assuming a specific functional form for utility, it is possible to derive the
optimal consumption path. For simplicity of exposition, let the utility function
in (1) simply be the linear quadratic u (c) = c − κc22 . Optimal consumption is
then
c˜ih,t =
r
1 + r
EtX
i
h,t
(
gih,t, b
i
h,t; yh,s
)
, h = R,P, (5)
where we have assumed that β = 1/ (1 + r) and
Xih,t
(
gih,t, b
i
h,t; yh,s
) ≡ [(1 + r) bih,t + gih,t + ∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Et (yh,s − qh,s)
]
.
Equation (5) implies that the optimal consumption of group i is dependent
on the initial level of private borrowing and the amount of government trans-
fers to the group, as well as the discounted stream of expected output net of
investment.
3.2 Producers
The law of motion for capital, k, evolves according to
kh,s+1 = kh,s + qh,s, h = P,R, (6)
where we have assumed depreciation away, and have constrained investment to
purely domestic vehicles. Production technology is a function of invested capital
and (by assumption) does not differ between groups:7
yh,s = ah,sf (kh,s) , h = R,P, (7)
where as is a measure of productivity, and f ′ (·) > 0 > f ′′ (·). Productivity for
each country is governed by an AR(1) process,
ah,s+1 = (1 + ρh)
1−α
ah,s + h,s+1, h = R,P, (8)
dimensions, which would be invariably complicated by these dynamics. Moreover, we would
argue in general that the government budget position is more relevant in an explanation of
pre-crisis phenomena (Krugman 1979), rather than post-crisis events.
7The implicit assumptions here are that labor is supplied inelastically by the individual
producer, and that the Inada conditions, f (0) = 0, lim
k→0
f ′ (k) = ∞, and lim
k→∞
f ′ (k) = 0,
hold.
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where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, ρ is a persistence parameter, and s is an economy-wide
Gaussian shock experienced at time s, with Ett+1 = 0 and distributed according
to the density function ϕ () with support [−¯, ¯]. Aggregate production in each
country is then simply the sum of each group’s production, or Yh,s = Ihyh,s,
and aggregate investment is Qh,s = Ihqh,s.
To provide some structure to the international economy, we make some as-
sumptions concerning the developed and developing country production struc-
tures.
Assumption 1 (Production structures). (a) ρR = 0 and ρP > 0; (b) ∀s :
{aR,s = 1 > aP,s and kP,s  kR,s such that aR,sf ′ (kP,s) < aP,sf ′ (kR,s)}.
The first part of the assumption suggests that production is generally more
volatile in the developing country, and shocks to this economy are amplified: A
positive shock will lead to higher output in the developing country vis-a`-vis the
developed, but negative shocks have a greater impact as well. This specification
is also for more than just analytical convenience: There is evidence that there
are important nonlinearities in the impact of volatility on growth, and that this
impact is more pronounced for developing countries (Aizenman & Pinto 2004).
Therefore, (8), with the assumption ρ > 0, attempts to capture a limited aspect
of this empirical phenomenon.
The second part of the assumption ensures that, while productivity is higher
in the developed country, the capital stock in the developing country is suffi-
ciently small such that the marginal product of capital will always be higher
in the developing country. This allows the model to capture the empirical ob-
servation that developing country returns are typically higher than developed
country returns, even in the absence of an explicit risk premium. Note that this
assumption also renders expected output stable in the developed country.
To avoid problems of global indeterminacy, we make an additional assump-
tion concerning international capital flows.
Assumption 2 (Net aggregate capital flows). ∀s < t : (a) R,s = R > 0; (b)
YR,s−EsY˘R,s > QR,s−EsQ˘R,s, where Z˘R,t ≡ r1+r
∑∞
s=tEtZs is the permanent
level of variable Z.
The first part of the assumption imposes a constant, positive value to the
actual realization of the shock in the developed country,8 while the second part
guarantees that, given part (a), the developed country has a current account
surplus. Taken together, this assumption ensures that, in the absence of a
financial crisis, aggregate net capital flows from the developed country to the
developing one.9 Note that the specification that we have chosen is flexible
enough to allow for individual groups in each country to be either net borrowers
8This assumption, which is to ensure a nondegenerate current account, is actually
stronger than necessary. A weaker (but sufficient) condition is to assume that ∀s < t :{
R,s 6= 0 and
∑
s R,s > 0
}
. We have chosen the specification above to impose more struc-
ture on the problem and hence simplify the algebra.
9To see this, note that the current account identity is given by CAR,t ≡ BR,t+1 −BR,t =
rBR,t+YR,t−
∑
i c
i
R,t−QR,s−GR,t, where GR,t is the fiscal budget constraint. Substituting
10
or net lenders; all that we require is that, in the aggregate, the current account
of the developing country be in deficit, and vice versa for the developed country.
Hence, rich elite groups in the developing country, for example, may choose to
park their wealth in foreign assets (Tornell & Velasco 1992).
The (inverse) demand for capital by each group sets the expected marginal
product of capital to the cost of capital. This cost is the world interest rate,
corrected for the conditional covariance of the marginal product of capital and
the marginal rate of substitution:
Et [ah,t+1f ′ (kh,t+1)] = r − covt
[
ah,t+1f
′ (kh,t+1) ,
cih,t+1
cih,t
]
, h = R,P, (9)
where we have once again used the assumption that β = 1/ (1 + r). This can be
further simplified by assuming that investment is determined by the certainty
equivalence principle, such that the covariance term is constant:10
Et [ah,t+1f ′ (kh,t+1)] = r∗h, h = R,P, (10)
where r∗h ≡ r − cov
[
ah,t+1f
′ (kh,t+1) ,
cih,t+1
cih,t
]
. Since all capital is held only by
domestic residents, the covariance term is likely to be negative, and hence this
equation also implies that r∗P > r
∗
R = r.
Again appealing to the ease of exposition, let the production function in (7)
be a simple AK-type f (k) = akα, where 0 < α < 1. These specific functional
forms and simplifying assumptions allow us to rewrite (after some algebra) (5)
for each country as
c˜ih =
r
1 + r
Xih
(
gih, b
i
h; yh
)
, h = R,P, (11)
where
XiR
(
giR, b
i
R; yR
) ≡ [(1 + r) biR + giR + ( 1+rr ) yR] ,
XiP
(
giP , b
i
P ; yP
) ≡ [(1 + r) biP + giP + (1+r)(r−ρ) · (r∗P−αρ)r∗P yP ] ,
and r∗P ≡ r − cov
[
αaP,t+1k
α−1
P,t+1,
ciP,t+1
ciP,t
]
.
the fiscal budget constraint (13) and optimal consumption (5) into the above and using As-
sumption 2(a) will then simplify the expression to CAR,t =
(
YR,s − Y˘R,s
)
−
(
QR,s − Q˘R,s
)
.
For the developed country to be a net lender in the aggregate, we require
(
YR,s − Y˘R,s
)
>(
QR,s − Q˘R,s
)
, which is Assumption 2(b). Finally, since this is a two-country world,
CAR,t = −CAP,t and so this assumption also guarantees that the developing country will be
a net borrower, in the aggregate.
10While this loses some of the dynamics of the determinants of the investment decision,
changes in the covariance term in (9) are likely to be empirically small as compared to expected
changes in the marginal product of capital. This assumption is also milder than assuming
that the marginal product of capital and the marginal rate of substitution are independent,
which would then yield a similar nonstochastic term on the right hand side of (10).
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To economize on notation, we have dropped time subscripts, since optimal
consumption is completely determined at time t. Post-tax welfare of a group is
then just optimal consumption net of taxes:
W ih (gh) = c˜
i
h − τh, h = R,P. (12)
3.3 Government
In each country, government transfers are funded by a common, lump-sum tax,
τ , for each group. With no government investment, the fiscal budget constraint
for each country is given by
Nhτh =
Ih∑
i=1
N ihg
i
h +NhDh (gh, T ) , h = R,P, (13)
where Dh (gh, T ) is an intergovernmental debt function (expressed in per capita
terms) representing official lending (or borrowing); this is conducted at a risk-
free rate, which is normalized to unity. Since the actual official loan function
is not of primary interest here, in this formulation we will refrain from fully
characterizing the structural form of the package, but merely assume that this
function is dependent on the vector of transfers g and the amount of time spent
in bargaining over the official loan package, T .
Government policymakers possess objective functions that that are given by
WGh (Wh,Lh, ιh) = Et
∞∑
s=t
δs−tw [W (gh,s) ,L (gh,s), ιh], h = R,P, (14)
where W (gs) and L (gs) are the vectors that correspond to the welfare of all
groups in the country and contributions received at time s, respectively, ι is
political capital accrued, and δ is government’s subjective discount rate. Note
that we have entered the redistributive policy vector, g, indirectly into the gov-
ernment objective function; thus, governments are—in the terminology of Dixit,
Grossman & Helpman (1997)—partially benevolent, insofar as policymakers do
not impose personal preferences about this policy outcome. We will clarify the
specific form that (14) takes as we solve the model, below.
3.4 Special Interests
In each country, there are Jh organized lobbying groups, which constitute a
subset of the population, such that for a particular lobbying group i ∈ Jh ⊆ Ih.11
These groups offer contributions according to a schedule, Lih (gh), with the aim
of influencing the policymaker’s allocation of government transfers. Given these
11Our characterization of special interests is fairly broad: Most commonly, these may be
sectoral groups, but the specification is flexible enough to accommodate interest groups in
either broad coalitions, such as class-based or tradable-nontradable distinctions, or regional
interests, such as provinces or states.
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contributions, the net welfare of a group is then post-tax welfare, minus any
contributions:
V ih (gh) = W
i
h (gh)− Lih (gh) . (15)
The contribution schedule itself is assumed to be globally truthful,12 and
thus satisfies
Lih
(
gh; ηih
)
= min
{
L¯ih (gh) ,max
[
0,W i (g)− ηih
]}
, h = R,P, (16)
where L¯ih (gh) ≡ sup
{
Lih (gh) | V ih (gh) ≥ 0
}
is the upper limit of feasible con-
tributions that group i is willing to undertake, and ηi is a constant, set optimally,
that may be regarded as the reservation utility of the ith lobbying group.
Rewriting (12) in terms of the redistributive policy instrument g, and the
definition in (11) now yields
W ih (gh) =
r
1 + r
Xih
(
gih, b
i
h; yh
)− [ Ih∑
i=1
N ih
Nh
· gih +Dh (gh, T )
]
, h = R,P.
3.5 Debt Markets
To close the model, we need to specify global equilibrium conditions for the
debt market. Since there are only two countries in the model, market clearing
requires that
IR∑
i=1
N iRb
i
R +
IP∑
i=1
N iP b
i
P = BR +BP = 0 (17)
for private debt markets, and
NRDR (gR, T ) +NPDP (gP , T ) = 0 (18)
for official borrowing and lending.
3.6 Sequence of Events
The timing of the model is as follows: (a) an (exogenous) crisis occurs in the de-
veloping country; (b) policymakers from each country gather under the auspices
of the IMF to formulate a proposal for a loan package (with attendant transfer
to the developing country), taking into account the interests of their respective
constituents; (c) special interests in both the developed country (banks) and de-
veloping country (banks and firms) offer their contributions to attain a desired
redistribution/repayment handout; (d) developed and developing country pol-
icymakers engage in post-crisis redistribution through government transfers—
which may be regarded as bailout funds for beleaguered banks and/or favors
for connected firms—and effect repayment decisions. This is summarized as
Figure 1.
12Since both the special interest and policymaker welfare functions are quasilinear, the
local truthfulness property holds, and is sufficient to characterize the political dynamics. This
stronger assumption is essentially an equilibrium selection device, and we discuss this in detail
below.
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Figure 1: Sequence of events.
3.7 Financial Crisis
Let the financial crisis occur at time t in the developing country. The crisis
leads to monetary, real, and political effects in the respective economies.
First, there is a forced termination of international credit relationships; one
may envision this as a typical “sudden stop” (Dornbusch, Goldfajn & Valde´s
1995) where there is a rapid reversal of (usually short-term, though not exclu-
sively so) capital flows. Most commonly, this occurs due to a deterioration in
the debtor country’s terms of trade; however, it may also occur for other reasons
such as financial contagion. We take this event as given, and seek to examine
the solution of the model by treating this as an exogenous shock. At this point,
the solvency condition is modified to
bis = (1 + r)
s+1−t
bt, ∀s ∈ [t, T ] & h = R,P. (4′)
This cessation of international financial flows is the primary monetary ef-
fect of the financial crisis, and persists for all periods s > t, until the economy
graduates from the crisis at time T , after which international capital flows re-
sume, and the solvency condition returns to (4).13 This, in effect, suggests the
following assumption about repayments.
Assumption 3 (Repayment schedule). (a) bih,T+1 = (1 + r)
T+1−t
bih,t, h =
R,P ; (b) ∃ T¯  T such that Dh,T¯ (gh, T ) = 0.
We have thus assumed, in turn, that each group i effects repayment of the
pre-crisis borrowing amount—with interest—immediately after the crisis (with
no private borrowing allowed within that period); and that sovereign debt re-
payment is effected outside the model (we can thus accommodate partial re-
pudiation of sovereign debt). Clearly, the case where private repayments are
always effected in full at time T +1 need not necessarily hold, absent a means of
13Hence, the international real rate r is assumed to be unaffected by the crisis.
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international private debt enforcement. Here, we abstract from repudiation is-
sues and assume that a form of gunboat diplomacy ensures that the assumption
holds.
In spite of the apparent strength of this assumption, however, remaining in
crisis is not costless. Note that, following Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996), we have
treated the international real interest rate, r, as exogenously given. The loss
of access to international private debt markets thus removes one instrument for
the purposes of consumption smoothing as well as consumption augmenting.14
To the extent that welfare is lower due to this, there is an implicit penalty to
both creditors and debtors for remaining in financial autarky, and the post-
crisis aftermath is functionally equivalent to modeling an explicit haircut faced
by creditors.
The financial crisis also induces real effects in the developing economy.15 In
particular, we treat this as a negative shock, P,t < 0, such that the productivity
change at time t will be
∆aP,t < 0. (19)
For simplicity, we assume that once this crisis shock is realized, the value of
the shock remains at the initial realization; that is, P,s = P,t ∀s ∈ [t, T ]. As in
the case of nominal effects, the real effect captured by (19) will continue until
the crisis is resolved at time T. After this point, productivity growth returns to
positive territory. Taken together, (4′) and (19) are consistent with the stylized
fact documented in Kaminsky, Reinhart & Ve´gh (2005), that net capital inflows
are procyclical in most developing economies.
The crisis, then, prompts fiscal redistribution. Since we have set disburse-
ments to one-time events, we assume that this occurs after the time of gradua-
tion:
gih,T+1 6= 0, h = R,P. (20)
Third, the financial crisis also has political effects. In particular, the crisis
leads to a decline in the reservation utility for some groups, such that
∆ηiP,t < 0. (21)
This leads to a change in the power structure of developing country special
interests, such that IP ⊇ J ′P ⊇ JP ,16 where J ′P is the post-crisis set of lobby-
ing groups. Intuitively, this could occur for several reasons. First, for larger
14Recognizing consumption augmenting for the developing country is straightforward. For
the developed country, note that in the absence of international lending, marginal returns to
capital would likely be driven down due to the assumption of diminishing returns to capital,
f ′′ (·) < 0, and hence lending can serve an augmentation motive there as well.
15This is in line with the so-called third-generation models—such as Aghion, Bacchetta &
Banerjee (2001) and Chang & Velasco (2001)—that stress, inter alia, the potential for real
spillovers in the event of a financial crisis. Note that our specification is also flexible enough
to accommodate the possibility that these real shocks have nominal origins, such as liquidity
constraints that arise form currency and maturity mismatches, as was the case in the Asian
financial crisis.
16We demonstrate this result, and the technical apparatus underlying it, more fully in the
appendix.
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groups, Olson-style (positive) selective incentives arise more strongly in a crisis
climate.17 Second, a crisis may lead to the breakup of large groups into smaller
ones that face less resistance to collective action in general. Taken together,
both of these factors help overcome collective-action problems that are more
pervasive in a non-crisis environment.
3.8 Solution of Model
We employ the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept and solve the sequen-
tial game by backward induction.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium outcome). The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
is a tuple {{Li∗P }i∈JP ,{Li∗R}i∈JR , D∗R (g∗R, T ∗) , D∗P (g∗P , T ∗) ,g∗R,g∗P } such that:
(a) Li∗h is feasible ∀i ∈ Jh, h = R,P ; (b) ∀i ∈ IR: { @ giR ∈ G and giR 6= gi∗R
such that V i
(
gi∗R
) ≤ V i (giR)}; (c) ∀i ∈ IP : { @ giP ∈ G and giP 6= gi∗P such
that V i
(
gi∗P
) ≤ V i (giP )}; (d) @ gh ∈ G and gh 6= g∗h such that WGh (g∗h) ≤
WGh (gh) , h = R,P ; (e) @ Dh (gh, T ) ∈ D and Dh (gh, T ) 6= D∗h (g∗h, T ∗) such
that WGh (g
∗
h, T
∗
h ) ≤WGh (gh, Th) , h = R,P , in pure strategies.
In the final stage, the crisis is resolved, and group welfare will return to
the pre-crisis status quo given by (12), adjusted by the repayment term. The
policymaker in the developing country takes the intergovernmental debt func-
tion, DP (g, T ), as given and solves a Grossman-Helpman style menu auction
that maximizes a weighted sum of contributions and general (post-tax gross)
welfare:18
WGP (gP ,LP ) = (1− ωP )
∑
i∈IP
N iPW
i
P (gP ) + ωP
∑
i∈J′P
N iPL
i
P (gP ),
where ωP is the weight placed on special interest contributions by policymakers
in the developing country. Given the contribution schedule (16), this is then
functionally equivalent to maximizing a weighted sum of special interest and
general welfare:
WGP (gP ) =
∑
i∈J′P
N iPW
i
P (gP ) + (1− ωP )
∑
i/∈J′P
N iPW
i
P (gP ). (22)
These special interests may be regarded as domestic banks, or as domestic firms
run by the country’s elite. One nice feature of casting the problem in terms
of (22) is that it also accommodates the possibility that the policymaker may
be completely benevolent, but the groups i ∈ J ′P are sectors that need to be
17For example, lobbying contributions may be regarded as a form of cooperative insurance
premium paid to participate in joint lobbying efforts for bailout funds; similarly, since handouts
received are club benefits that only accrue to group members, there is a stronger inducement
for participation to ensure group success.
18Note that this is equivalent to maximizing subject to net welfare, given an appropriate
normalization, and a minor restriction on the weights. We follow the literature here and,
accordingly, utilize welfare gross of contributions and repayments.
16
supported in order for the economy to fully recover from the crisis. For example,
these groups may be the banking system, or certain high-productivity industries
for which the economy has a comparative advantage. Providing transfers to
these groups are then critical to ensure the continued viability of the post-
crisis economy, and hence policymakers accordingly place a higher weight (up
to unity) on the welfare of these groups.19
The equilibrium allocation of government transfers will satisfy the first order
necessary conditions:
DPg
(
giP
)
=
{
r
1+r − 1 + ωP (1− λP ) , ∀i ∈ J ′P ,
r
1+r − 1− ωPλP(1−ωP ) , ∀i /∈ J ′P ,
(23)
where 0 ≤ λP ≡
∑
i∈J′P
NiP
NP
≤ 1 is the share of the population organized as
lobbies, and the term DPg indicates the derivative of DP taken with respect to
giP . It will be useful to re-express the above in the form:
gi∗P = D
−1
Pg
[
ωPλP
ωP − 1 + φ
i
P ·
ωP [1 + ωP (λP − 1)]
1− ωP −
1
1 + r
]
, (24)
where φiP takes on unity if a group has lobbying power, and zero otherwise.
Equation (23) presents several notable features. First, the resulting allo-
cation is typically not equivalent to the utilitarian outcome. The utilitarian
optimum, which is a useful benchmark case, can be obtained by maximizing∑
i∈IP
NiP
NP
W iP (gP ) subject to a resource constraint given by
∑
i∈IP N
i
P c˜
i
P =
NP [yP +D (·)] +
∑
i∈IP N
i
P g
i
P . The solution for this is DPg
(
giP
)
= r1+r − 1.
Second, the resulting allocations between organized lobby and non-lobby
groups are asymmetric—in the sense that they are not egalitarian—except in
the special case where the weight placed by the policymaker on special interest
welfare is zero (ωP = 0), when all groups are organized as lobbies (λP = 1), or
when no groups are organized as lobbies (λP = 0). In these cases, the solution
reduces to giP = D
−1
Pg
(
− 11+r
)
, which is the utilitarian outcome.
Third, notice also that since government disbursements to groups with lobby-
ing power are funded by taxpayers—in accordance with (13)—the policy variable
g may also be viewed as bailout funds. Moreover, these funds may involve indi-
rect transfers across borders. To see this, note that with the assumption of no
repudiation, the post-crisis optimal consumption path (which is (11) corrected
by Assumption 3 above) implies that groups will make private debt repayments
in equilibrium. Taken together with the debt market clearing conditions (17)
and (18) suggests that developed country lending may well be paid for by devel-
oping country taxpayers, or vice versa. More formally, bR = b [gP (τP )].
19In this case, the game outlined in Figure 1 will collapse to a lesser game, without the
contributions stage. The structure of the game itself remains unchanged. Whether certain
groups receive a higher weight in the optimization problem because of their inherent impor-
tance to the economy in a time of crisis, or because they offer contributions through political
connections, is, ultimately, an empirical issue.
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Finally, the misallocation (relative to the utilitarian optimum) of the bailout
funds are such that groups with (without) lobbying power obtain more (less)
than the optimal amount. To see this, note that the difference between (23)
and the utilitarian optimum is ωP (1− λP ) ≥ 0 for an organized group, and
− λPωP(1−ωP ) ≤ 0 for an unorganized group.
It is possible to specify an analogous policymaker problem for the developed
country. The problem in this case is
WGR (gR,LR) = (1− ωR)
∑
i∈IR
N iRW
i
R (gR) + ωR
∑
i∈JR
N iRL
i
R (gR), (25)
where ωR is the weight placed on special interest welfare in the developed coun-
try. Special interests in the developed country may be regarded as global banks
with significant emerging market loan portfolios. The first order conditions are
analogous to (23), and the equilibrium allocation for a group i is
gi∗R = D
−1
Rg
[
ωRλR
ωR − 1 + φ
i
R ·
ωR [1 + ωR (λR − 1)]
1− ωR −
1
1 + r
]
, (26)
where 0 ≤ λR ≡
∑
i∈JR
NiR
NR
≤ 1, and φiR takes on unity if a group has lobbying
power, and zero otherwise.
We can now draw a distinction between pre- and post-crisis group consump-
tion. For tractability, we let the per capita debt function be given simply by
the linear quadratic, Dh = ν
g2h
2 + Π (T ) for h = R,P , where ν is an exogenous
multiplicative constant, and Π is a function. We then obtain the following result
on changes in consumption patterns.
Proposition 1 (Consumption change). The change in optimal consumption for
group i in country h due to the crisis is given by
∆c˜ih = r∆B
i
h+H∆y
i
h+
r
ν (1 + r)
·
[
ωhλh
ωh − 1 −
1
1 + r
+
ωh [1 + ωh (λh − 1)]
1− ωh · φ
i
h
]
,
(27)
where Bih ≡
[
(1 + r)T−t − 1
]
bih,t, and H ≡ 1 if h = R and H ≡ r(r−ρ) · (r
∗
P−αρ)
r∗P
if h = P .
Proof. See appendix.
One implication of the foregoing analysis is that, since the crisis changes the
power structure such that post-crisis special interest representation intensifies
due to (21), we might expect contributions in tranquil times to be relatively
small. This finding may provide some mileage in explaining the Tullock puz-
zle of apparent underinvestment in special interest politics. As in Grossman
& Helpman (1994, 2001), it is competition among lobbies for the same policy
vector that allows the policymaker to capture all the surplus from its relation-
ship with various interest groups. Therefore, equilibrium contributions may
be much lower than one might expect, given the stakes. Moreover, the con-
sumption change to being organized may also be small, if policymaker weight
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contributions lightly (ω → 0). In addition, our general equilibrium setup is also
consistent with the observation by Ansolabere, de Figueiredo & Snyder (2003)
that it is individuals that are most active in campaign contributions. Since
political organization directly affects the post-crisis bailout vector, and hence
consumption, this provides individuals within groups an incentive to contribute.
In contrast to their paper, however, this does not stem from contributions pro-
viding consumption benefits through utility from participation in the political
process, but from the benefits of higher expected post-crisis consumption.20
In the penultimate stage, groups offer their truthful contributions. As argued
by Bernheim & Whinston (1986), truthful strategies are played in equilibrium,
since these constitute best responses to other players’ strategy sets (as long as
their sets include a truthful strategy as well), and are coalition proof. For these
reasons, we follow the literature and treat the equilibria given by each Li∗h , i ∈ Jh
and h = R,P , as focal. This is the basis for our global truthfulness assumption,
made earlier.
Now consider the foregoing stage. Here, the IMF Executive Board acts as
an intermediary that provides a forum for representatives from both countries
to bargain over the amount of official lending (Dooley & Verma 2003; Gould
2003).21 In particular, by using the policy vector g∗ from (24) and (26), and
the feasible set
{
Li∗
}
i∈J , we proceed to model a bargaining situation for the
official loan function involving the developed and developing country, under the
auspices of the IMF.
We operationalize this bargaining process as a war-of-attrition timing game
between the governments of the developed and developing country. Govern-
ments solve for the optimal concession time based on total aggregate payoffs
that result from being the leader versus being a follower; for the developing
country, then, the payoffs to leadership are
WLP (g
∗
P , TP ) =
TP∑
S=t
δS−tWˆP,S +
∞∑
S=TP+1
δS−(TP+1)WP , (28)
where WˆP ≡
∑
i∈IP Wˆ
i
P , which is the simple aggregation of groups’ welfare
in crisis, and WP ≡
∑
i∈IP
(
W iP − biP
)
is the analogous aggregate of non-crisis
20This holds so long as we are willing to allow group members’ contribution schedules to be
approximated by the group’s contribution schedule, and for policymakers to be aware of the
sector(s) from which the majority of their supporters are based.
21According to this school of thought, the IMF is typically couched as responsive to political
pressures from major donor countries, such that any IMF package is essentially a compromise
between these developed countries—especially the United States—and the developing economy
seeking the package. The second school treats the IMF as a bureaucracy, with preferences that
are maximized subject to various constraints; in this case, the IMF is an active participant
in structuring the official loan (Vaubel 1991). In our treatment we limit the discussion to the
former view, which we believe is a more plausible model of most episodes of IMF lending in
crisis periods.
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welfare, adjusted by Assumption 3. In contrast, payoffs to being a follower are
WFP (g
∗
P , TP ) =
TP∑
S=t
δS−tWˆP,S +
∞∑
S=TP+1
δS−(TP+1)WP + δTP−tιP
= WLP (g
∗
P , TP ) + δ
TP−tιP ,
(29)
where ι > 0 is the political capital gained from not giving in to foreign (cred-
itor) country pressure, whether actual or perceived. The returns to political
capital decrease over time, since any such capital gained from not being the
first to concede is gradually eroded by the worsening economic conditions that
result from financial autarky, as well as by natural discounting. There is some
empirical evidence that such inverse audience costs are of salience to post-crisis
negotiations involving the IMF (Bird 1996); here, we have chosen to model the
idea of audience salience and its impact on the size of the win-set (Putnam
1988) somewhat abstractly as political capital. Note, also, that this measure
is not necessarily restricted to the general populace. Indeed, it could just as
well accrue from the support that the current regime in power receives from its
patrons.22
In equilibrium, then, there exists an optimal concession time; we assume
that the probability of concession by country h is captured by the distribution
function, Ξh(Th), with the associated density, ξh(Th). Expected welfare in that
case is
EWGP (g
∗
P , TP ) = [1− ΞR(TP )]WLP (g∗P , TP ) +
TP∑
S=t
ξR(S)WFP (g
∗
P , S). (30)
This equation captures the fact that the expected welfare of the policymaker
in the developing country over the bargaining process is the sum of two terms:
The welfare when the policymaker concedes first, multiplied by the likelihood
that he or she concedes; and the welfare from being a follower, multiplied by the
likelihood that the developed country policymaker concedes first. The optimal
concession time for the developing country policymaker is then characterized by
T ∗P = arg max
TP
EWGP (g
∗
P , TP ).
The analogous equations for payoffs in the developed country are straight-
forward, and are
WLR (g
∗
R, TR) =
TR∑
S=t
δS−tWˆR,S +
∞∑
S=TR+1
δS−(TR+1)WR, and (31)
22It is fairly straightforward to endogenize this term as a function of special and general
interests. Let ι (ωP ) be the political capital term, with
∂ι
∂ω
> 0. In this case, an increase in
the weight placed by policymakers on special interests will lead to an increase in their political
capital gained.
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WFR (gR, TR) =
TR∑
S=t
δS−tWˆR,S +
∞∑
S=TR+1
δS−(TR+1)WR + δTR−tιR; (32)
these equations will yield an optimal concession time for the developed country
policymaker:
T ∗R = arg max
TR
EWGR (g
∗
R, TR).
Unless we are willing to make some additional assumptions, there is no
closed-form solution for the optimal concession time, since time is a discrete
variable.23 Hence, we make several parameter and distributional assumptions
that assist us in obtaining a closed form solution, which in turn provides us with
a notion of the equilibrium.
Assumption 4 (Parameterization). (a) T = t+1; (b) ∀s ∈ [t, T ] : gih,s = τh,s =
Dh,s (gh, T ) = 0, h = R,P ; (c) R = E (R) = 0; (d)
∫ ∗P
−¯ ϕ (P |aP < 0) d =∫ 0
∗P
ϕ (P |∆aP < 0) d = 0.25; (e) ∀S ∈ [t, T ] : ξh(S) = 0.25, h = R,P .
Taken together, the assumptions above confine the crisis to two periods,
constrain several variables of the model to zero, and impose uniform distribu-
tions on shocks as well as concession probabilities. With Assumption 4, we can
show that the optimal concession time is determined by a country taking into
account its aggregate autarkic welfare, post-crisis welfare, and the discounted
expected value of political capital. More generally, the solution will be such that
each country will evaluate, at the margin, the expected cost of being the first
to concede versus the expected gain of waiting another period before doing so.
This expected cost simply the persistent welfare losses due to financial autarky,
while the gain is given by the probability that the other country concedes first,
conditional on the present country having not yet conceded at this point, mul-
tiplied by the benefits to her of not conceding and thereby reaping the political
capital gains from standing firm.24
In equilibrium, the intergovernmental debt function is given by
NPDP (g∗P , T
∗) = −NRDR (g∗R, T ∗) , (33)
where T ∗ = min {T ∗P , T ∗R}. Intergovernmental debt, then, is a function of the
equilibrium redistribution vector and concession time. These, in turn, are a
function of primitives that include, inter alia, the vector of political organization,
political capital, debt, output, and the world and domestic interest rates. These
are captured in the following proposition.
23In the appendix, we recast the model in continuous time and solve, implicitly, for the
function that characterizes the optimal time in that case.
24Note that our assumption of full repayment, while used in the proof, is not critical for
generating our results, so long as there is some political capital at stake, and autarky welfare
is dominated by post-crisis welfare. Fully enforced partial repayment will simply shorten the
optimal concession time, since welfare with the resumption of capital flows will now be higher.
In the limit where there is full repudiation, the optimal concession time will then depend on
the relative size of political capital vis-a`-vis (12) without adjusting for repayment.
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Proposition 2 (Equilibrium lending). In equilibrium, the intergovernmental
debt function for a country h is a function of the optimal post-crisis redistri-
bution vector, g∗h, and the optimal concession time, T
∗
h′ , of the country h
′ that
yields first in the negotiation process. These, in turn, are a function of economic
and political primitives. That is,
NhDh (g∗, T ∗) = Nh
[
ν
g∗2h
2
+ Π (min {T ∗P , T ∗R})
]
, (34)
where g∗h = g (φh, r;ωh, λh), and T
∗
h = T (φh, ιh, r, r¯
∗
h, bh, yh, τh;ωh, λh, ρh, α).
Proof. See appendix.
One feature of the analysis above is that it provides the theoretical under-
pinnings for precisely how political risk may help explain the Lucas paradox,
an argument that has been advanced previously by others (Reinhart & Rogoff
2004; Tornell & Velasco 1992). In contrast to these authors, however, political
risk in our model is specifically defined in terms of the expected welfare costs
embedded in politically-motivated post-crisis bargaining (as opposed to default
and appropriation risk, respectively). Thus, even without the risk of default or
appropriation, fears over a lengthy bargaining process may lead to the paucity
of capital flows, ex ante. As a result, lenders may then be less inclined to take
advantage of the marginal productivity differences set out in Assumption 1.
This sort of political risk may be sufficient to keep capital at home, attenuating
home market bias.25 Note also that the risk of appropriation, per se, is not nec-
essary for this outcome. While our model accommodates this possibility very
nicely, the explanation we forward is driven by ex ante lending restraint due to
anticipated welfare losses from financial autarky, not offsetting capital flows due
to concerns over forced redistribution.
One other nice feature of our model is that it captures the notion that out-
put losses due to financial autarky may act as an enforcement mechanism for
debt repayment, an idea developed in Dooley & Verma (2003). In contrast to
their model, which allows for partial repayment, we have proceeded with an
(admittedly extreme) assumption that there is full repayment of the debt over-
hang after the resumption of capital flows. Nonetheless, policymakers continue
to have an incentive to extricate themselves from financial autarky, since they
will continue to pay welfare losses if the war of attrition drags on. The extent
to which they are willing to tarry, then, will in part be determined by the dis-
counted stream of welfare losses from remaining in financial autarky, versus the
the discounted stream of welfare should they resume capital flows and be re-
quired to return to pre-crisis debt levels. The fact that certain highly-indebted
countries have been more willing to prolong debt renegotiations than otherwise
may be reflective of this calculus.
25To see this, define W¯ is as the autarky welfare of a group i at time s. A group in the
developed country will then choose a value of bR,s such that E0
∑t−1
s=0WR,s+E0
∑T
s=t WˆR,s+
E0
∑∞
s=T+1WR,s = E0
∑∞
s=0 W¯R,s. There could then exist values of b
i
R,s such that b
i
R,s <
b¯iR,s, where b¯
i
R is the value of b
i
R that would result in the absence of political risk.
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4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 The Differential Impact of Crises
In this subsection, we seek to test the idea that post-crisis redistribution typi-
cally occurs in an asymmetric manner, especially in certain sectors of the econ-
omy (stage 4 of the game). In particular, we seek to test the implications of
Proposition 1 by estimating (27) for the case of crisis countries. We operational-
ize this into an econometric model given by
∆c˜h,i,n
Rν
= γω + γB∆Bh,i,n + γy∆yh,i,n + γφφh,i + Xh,i,nΓ + εh,i,n, (35)
where γω ≡ ωhλhωh−1 + R − 1, γB ≡ r, γy ≡ r(r−ρ) ·
(r∗h−αρ)
r∗h
, γφ ≡ ωh[1+ωh(λh−1)]1−ωh ,
and Γ = [γ1 · · · γo]′ is a (o× 1) vector of coefficients; R ≡ r1+r is the annuity
rate, φh,i is an indicator variable that takes on unity when the household n in
country h belongs to a sector i that is politically organized, and zero otherwise,
Xh,i,n is a (n× o) matrix of household-specific controls, and εh,i,n ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
is an i.i.d. disturbance term.
The household-specific controls that are included in the matrix, Xh,i,n, which
includes demographic variables such as initial consumption, average years of ed-
ucation in the household, household size, household health, ethnicity, and dum-
mies for the age and gender for the head of household. In addition, we include
dummies for employment sector and geographic district. Finally, we capture the
change in household debt, ∆Bh,i,n, with asset variables for ownership of house-
hold durables, agricultural, and business assets (since asset sales may provide
necessary liquidity in the event of a crisis).26
We draw on two sets of data to investigate (35):
• The Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) dataset, part of the Family Life
Surveys database, conducted and maintained by the RAND Corporation.
We use longitudinal data from the 1997 IFLS2 and 2000 IFLS3 datasets,
with supplementary data from the 1993 IFLS1, for approximately 2,600
households, covering 13 (out of 26) provinces of Indonesia.
• The Bulgarian Integrated Household Survey (IHS) dataset, part of the
broader Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys
database, commissioned by the development economics group of the World
Bank. We use longitudinal data from the 1995 and 1997 IHS for approxi-
mately 2,000 households, covering all regions and provinces of Bulgaria.
The advantages of both datasets are that they are highly representative of the
population in general, with a remarkably low attrition rate between the two time
26We do not have debt data at household level; even if and these were available, they
would be less meaningful in the empirical model since the correspondence of debt from group
to household level is likely to be more opaque. These asset variables thus provide a crude
measure of the impact of debt, which is in our theoretical model, on household consumption.
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periods. They also possess the distinct advantage that the household interviews
were conducted both just prior to and right after the crisis, thus providing us
with an ideal “natural experiment” setting for testing our theory.
The core and constructed variables used for the estimates are described in
detail in the data appendix. Here, we limit ourselves to a discussion of two
variables: The construction of the key independent variable of interest—the
political organization variable, φ—and the dependent variable.
Since no data exists for sectoral political organization per se, these were
constructed based on proxies. For Bulgaria, we utilized the membership roster of
the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), together with that
of Podkrepa CL, the most politically-active labor union in Bulgaria, which boasts
30 affiliate unions and represents some 150,000 workers. Sectors were coded as
politically organized when sectoral organization membership numbers exceeded
a certain threshold (relative to the other sectors). For the case of Bulgaria,
this included the manufacturing, agriculture, and science sectors, inter alia. For
Indonesia, we employed the Suharto Dependence Index, developed by the Castle
Group and discussed in Fisman (2001), and coded sectors as politically organized
when sectoral representation for politically-connected corporations exceeded a
certain threshold (relative to other sectors). In addition, since the Indonesian
military is widely regarded as politically-connected in both the Suharto and
Habibie administrations (Rabasa & Haseman 2002), we coded this sector as
politically organized as well.
Because optimal consumption for households is not observable, we proxy
this with real household consumption expenditures. The main disadvantage of
doing so is that realized expenditures are more likely to reflect consumption
net of taxes and other expenditures not captured by our theoretical model of
optimal consumption. To account for these other unmodeled factors, we deploy
the controls in (35) to improve the fit and generalizability of the empirical model.
Figure 2 graphs, by employment sector, average household real per capita
consumption expenditures pre- and post-crisis for Bulgaria and Indonesia. The
crisis exerts a heterogeneous impact on household consumption. Furthermore,
while consumption fell uniformly across the board in Bulgaria, in some sectors
in Indonesia—notably, in the politically-organized chemicals, military, and com-
munications sectors—there was actually an increase in post-crisis consumption.
We summarize our main findings for both countries in Table 1. Four alterna-
tive models were considered, as follows: (C1 ) OLS regression with demographic
variables, durable asset ownership, and employment sector as controls; (C2 )
Specification (C1 ) with agricultural assets included; (C3 ) Specification (C1 )
with business assets included; (C4 ) IV regression with real per capita expendi-
ture instrumented by real per capita income, together with controls.27
27Instrumenting for consumption takes into account two potential econometric issues. First,
real per capita consumption expenditures may be endogenous to changes in consumption
expenditures, since some households may have anticipated future income changes independent
of the crisis, and adjusted 1995 consumption accordingly. Second, and more importantly,
there might be measurement error in the data, either due to misreporting of consumption
expenditures, or due to measurement error correlation on each side of the regression equation.
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Table 1: Regressions for change in consumption expenditure†
Bulgaria Indonesia
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4)
Political 0.161 0.134 0.154 0.234 0.273 0.101 0.548 0.370
Organization (0.10)∗ (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)∗∗ (0.17) (0.22) (0.31)∗ (0.26)
Change in 0.048 0.046 0.049 0.044 0.088 0.112 0.092 0.112
Income (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗
Initial -0.856 -0.866 -0.860 -0.334 -0.689 -0.719 -0.767 0.170
Consumption (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.24)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.10)∗∗∗
Average HH 0.112 0.113 0.107 -0.018 0.201 0.261 0.201 -0.102
Education (0.05)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.07) (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗
HH size -0.082* -0.075 -0.064 0.000 -0.374 -0.494 -0.384 0.037
(0.05)∗ (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.07)
Health -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.052 -0.066 -0.006 0.010
shock (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Natural - - - - 0.280 0.380 0.264 0.116
disaster (0.12)∗∗ (0.13)∗∗∗ (0.30) (0.13)
Ethnicity 1 -0.067 -0.070 -0.073 0.019 0.056 -0.012 0.062 -0.055
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Ethnicity 2 -0.530 -0.553 -0.543 -0.208 -0.014 -0.137 0.016 -0.031
(0.13)∗∗∗ (0.13)∗∗∗ (0.13)∗∗∗ (0.21) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07)
Employment -0.173 -0.131 -0.149 -0.235 0.274 0.302 0.388 0.041
Sector 3 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.13)∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.11)
Employment -0.144 -0.108 -0.145 -0.175 -0.045 0.050 -0.109 0.025
Sector 8 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06)
Employment -0.146 -0.115 -0.150 -0.203 -0.133 -0.213 -0.148 -0.150
Sector 10 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.09)∗ (0.06)
Employment -0.181 -0.198 -0.194 -0.223 0.042 2.525 - -0.324
Sector 12 (0.010)∗ (0.10)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗ (0.11) (0.62)∗∗∗ (0.28) (0.49)
Employment -0.069 -0.040 -0.062 -0.090 -0.389 -0.315 -0.518 -0.460
Sector 14 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17)∗∗ (0.18)∗ (0.28)∗ (0.25)
Durable -0.484 -0.547 -0.486 -0.677 0.156 0.080 0.042 -0.012
Asset 7 (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.13)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.24) (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Durable - - - - 0.070 -0.013 0.038 -0.117
Asset 8 (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)∗∗
Durable 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.012 0.067 0.107 0.029 -0.010
Asset 9 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.05) (0.04)
Durable 0.156 0.150 0.159 0.143 0.113 0.287* 0.041 0.202
Asset 10 (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗ (0.09) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12)
Durable -0.392 -0.404 -0.379 -0.416 - - - -
Asset 13 (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.11)∗∗∗ (0.11)∗∗∗
Business -0.014 0.290
Asset 3 (0.20) (0.10)∗∗∗
Business -0.669 0.064
Asset 6 (0.33)∗∗ (0.05)
Business -0.116 0.105
Asset 7 (0.42) (0.08)
Business 0.254 -
Asset 16 (0.09)∗∗∗
Agricultural 0.392 -0.072
Asset 1 (0.12)∗∗∗ (0.06)
Agricultural -0.275 0.041
Asset 2 (0.16)∗ (0.05)
Agricultural 0.453 -0.515
Asset 9 (0.22)∗∗ (0.14)∗∗∗
R2 0.380 0.388 0.388 0.278 0.377 0.440 0.460 -
N 1325 1325 1325 1325 2383 906 931 2383
† Notes: A constant term was included in the regressions, but not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗
indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
1 percent level. Only selected control variables are reported, although all variables discussed in the data appendix
were included.
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Figure 2: Mean household real per capita consumption expenditures by sector.
Our findings are broadly supportive of the idea that sectors that were polit-
ically organized experienced a relatively smaller consumption decline vis-a`-vis
the other sectors in the economy. For Bulgaria, the coefficient for φ is positive
and at least marginally significant in two of the four specifications, and—after
instrumenting for initial consumption—significant at 5% level (C4 ). Similarly,
the coefficient for φ is positive in all specifications for Indonesia. While it was
only statistically significant at 10% in one specification (C2 ), it was approach-
ing statistical significance in two other specifications: (C1 ) and (C4 ) (with
p = 0.116 and p = 0.148, respectively).28 Given the level of disaggregation
in the data, we feel that these results provide some limited validation for our
theoretical model, at least for the two countries considered. We suspect that a
wider pattern may hold for other countries as well.
4.2 The Determinants of IMF Lending
In this subsection, we go on to test the the role that both domestic redistributive
politics and international bargaining have on IMF lending decisions (stage 2 of
the game). In particular, we seek to test the implications of Proposition 2 by
estimating (34). We treat the determinants as linear, and seek to estimate an
econometric model given by
Nh,tDh,t = ΘφΦt + ΘιIt + Yh,tΘY + Zh,tΘZ + υh,t, (36)
where Θφ, Θι, ΘY and ΘZ are (2× 1), (2× 1), (5× 1) and (o′ × 1) vectors
of coefficients, respectively, Φt = [φh,t φ−h,t]
′ is (2× 1) vector of the respective
aggregate measures of the extent of political organization in a developed and
developing country at time t, Ih,t = [ιh,t ι−h,t]
′ is a measure of how much
political capital policymakers in each country accrue at time t for not giving in
to the other country, Yh,t is a (h× 5) matrix comprised of r, r¯∗, b, y, τ , Zh,t is
a (h× o′) matrix of other (economic, political, and technocratic) determinants
of lending, and υh,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2υ
)
is an i.i.d. disturbance term.
28Tests on the instruments were conducted, but not reported; in summary, for both coun-
tries, the Anderson canonical correlation LR test rejects the null of underidentification, while
the Hansen-J test fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid.
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The other determinants that are included in the matrix, Zh,t, are other
technocratic factors that have been identified as important in IMF lending de-
cisions, including the country’s debt burden and past credit history (Knight
& Santaella 2002), as well as political influences such as political proximity to
lending countries and indices for rule of law (Barro & Lee 2005).
Our dataset draws on IMF lending patterns. In particular, we use, as our
measure of IMF lending, Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) and Extended Fund
Facility (EFF) arrangements.29 This was merged with data on international
financial and political factors, for a sample of 122 observations spanning 49
countries over the period 1971 through 2004.
We will limit our discussion here to the two political-economic variables of
interest, φ and ι, and leave the other variables for the data appendix.
The variable φ is an aggregate measure of special interest group (SIG) pres-
sure. Any such measure would need to incorporate two key considerations.
First, the measure, while necessarily indirect, should not be too far removed
from policymaker decisionmaking; otherwise, it may be contaminated by other
determinants that are not reflective of the pressures faced by the government
actor. Actual government expenditures are ideal for this purpose: Not only is
this not directly affected by private actors (as would be the case for a variable
such as export flows), it also captures realized pressures, since government ex-
penditures are zero-sum (and hence are removed from the problem of pressures
by groups in different sectors with opposing objectives, as would be the case
for tariff rates). Admittedly, there is the potential for observational equivalence
between special interest pressure and actual government preferences.
Second, since the measure also needs to be an aggregate representation of
the relative power of special interests in the economy, we require a measure
that takes into account the special (polar) cases where special interests are
either completely unorganized (λ = 0), or completely organized (λ = 1)—and
provide equivalent results in either case. Thus, φ needs to capture the deviation,
or distribution, of special interest power in the economy, by sector, with an
appropriate proxy for direct pressure.
We construct this measure for developing countries by placing sectors on the
abscissa, and government expenditure in a sector (as a share of GDP) on the
ordinate. The index of the distribution of special interest pressure in country h
is then a type of Gini index:30
φh,t =
∑Ih
i=1
∑Ih
−i=1 |Gi −G−i|
2I2hGh
, (37)
29In addition to the SBA and the EFF, the IMF also manages two other lending programs,
aimed primarily at very low-income countries: The Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF)
and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). To remain consistent with our
theoretical model, we exclude these arrangements from our measure of lending, since these are
representative of more long-term development lending, as opposed to the short-term balance-
of-payments assistance that the SBA and EFF were designed to provide.
30One key advantage, for our purposes, of employing a Gini-type index is that such a
measure satisfies anonymity, scale and population independence, and the transfer principle,
all of which are desirable for a measure of special interest pressure.
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whereGi is the government expenditure (as share of total expenditures) in sector
i, G is mean government expenditure shares, and the subscript, −i, indicates all
groups other than i. Thus, special interest pressure in the developing country
ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater distortion.
For developed countries, we require a more direct measure of special inter-
est pressure, since the distribution of government expenditures may be noisy
relative to the impact that certain groups have on influencing Fund lending be-
havior. Accordingly, we calculate an index of country lending exposure using
the Consolidated Banking Statistics compiled by the BIS. This involved taking
the ratio of foreign claims of reporting country banks on an individual coun-
try to total foreign claims of these reporting banks, such that special interest
pressure from country −h is:
φ−h,t =
Bh,−h,t∑H
h=1Bh,−h,t
, (38)
where Bh,−h,t are the foreign claims on country h by country −h at time t, and
total foreign claims are calculated across all countries, H.
We limit our selection of developed countries to the five largest lending na-
tions: The United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
These five countries correspond to the top five quota subscribers, as well as the
nations with the top five credit contributions among participating nations in
the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and New Arrangements to Bor-
row (NAB) plans.31 For tractability, we further reduce the variable set by taking
a simple average of lending exposure for Germany, France, and the United King-
dom, so that we have a single φ representing the European Union. Equation
(38) is thus analytically congruous to measures of developed-country special
interest pressure that have been employed by other authors (Oatley & Yackee
2004), although its expression here is in a more general form.
The idea of political capital that ι seeks to capture is harder to measure
quantitatively. This variable should exhibit the feature of being an accumula-
tive, valued political “prize” that is common to both the developing and devel-
oped nation. Unfortunately, proxy measures for this is likely to vary by context:
One can certainly conceive of how political capital acquired in financial crisis
negotiations may differ significantly from that obtained in a run-up to armed
conflict. For want of a more direct measure, we resort to using an index of
democracy as our proxy for such audience costs. In particular, we make use of
the measure of democracy developed by Freedom House (2004).32 We construct
a simple measure that averages the country’s ratings for both civil liberties and
31While the limitation to five lending nations may seem somewhat arbitrary, it is helpful to
note that with regard to all three arrangements, these nations contribute by far the largest
amounts to the IMF. For example, these five nations are the only ones to have supplementary
resource maximums of above $2.5 billion SDRs under the NAB. The next closest nation, Saudi
Arabia, has a maximum of $1.7 billion SDRs.
32Our use of this measure is motivated by both theoretical and empirical considerations.
We shy away from certain measures—such as the Henisz political constraint index—since
these place a heavy weight on the legislature, which is not explicitly addressed by our model.
Moreover, the Freedom House indices provide the greatest coverage over countries and across
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political rights, for an index that ranges between 0 (greatest political capital at
stake) and 7 (least political capital at stake).
The estimation of (36) presents its own set of problems. Data for IMF
lending is likely to exhibit both censorship as well as incidental truncation. The
former arises because the dependent variable will be censored at zero (one cannot
lend to the IMF), as well as potentially censored at the other tail (due to access
limits in accordance to country quota subscriptions).33 The latter problem is
fairly established in the empirical IMF lending literature: Since countries seek-
ing IMF aid are typically in crisis, their macroeconomic and political-economic
fundamentals are likely to display a systematic selection bias. To address the
first issue, we estimate a Tobit of the following form:
Nh,tD
′∗
h,t = Θ
′
φΦt + Θ
′
ιIt + Yh,tΘ
′
Y + Zh,tΘ
′
Z + υ
′
h,t,
Nh,tD
′
h,t = max
[
0, Nh,tD′∗h,t
]
.
(39)
We address the second issue by employing the selection model of Heck-
man (1979). Our specification considers the following latent dependent variable
model:34
Nh,tD
′′∗
h,t = Θ
′′
φΦt + Θ
′′
ι It + Yh,tΘ
′′
Y + Zh,tΘ
′′
Z + υ
′′
h,t,
Nh,tD
′′
h,t = ϑφφh,t + ϑιιh,t + Xh,tΘX + ζ
′′
h,t,
(40)
where the latter is the selection equation, X is a vector of additional controls
for the selection equation, υ′′h,t ∼ N(0, σ2υ′′) and ζ ′′h,t ∼ N (0, 1) are disturbance
terms with E(υ′′h,tζ
′′
h,t) = συ′′ζ′′ , and
Nh,tD
′′
h,t =
{
Nh,tD
′′∗
h,t if Nh,tD
′′∗
h,t > 0,
missing if Nh,tD′′∗h,t ≤ 0.
The findings for these benchmark regressions are reported in Table 2. The
various specifications are: (L1 ) OLS regression with controls implied by the the-
oretical model; (C2 ) Specification (L1 ) with additional economic and techno-
cratic controls; (L3 ) Tobit regression of (L1 ) with censoring at zero; (L4 ) Tobit
regression of (L2 ) with censoring at zero; (L5 ) Heckman maximum-likelihood
estimates of (L1 ); (L6 ) Heckman maximum-likelihood estimates of (L2 ).
The results provide general support for the idea that special interest pressure
as well as political capital matter in post-crisis resolution outcomes involving
the IMF. For most of the specifications, the amount of IMF lending is positively
time. In our robustness checks, we substitute our measure with the Polity index developed
by Marshall & Jaggers (2003).
33Censoring at this end is likely to be less of an issue in practice, since the access limit
constraint is seldom binding. Moreover, with the introduction of the Compensatory and Con-
tingency Financing Facility in 1988 and the Supplemental Reserve Facility in 1997, borrowing
countries actually have a fair degree of flexibility in exceeding their quota-established limits.
Accordingly, we do not control for this form of censoring.
34Note that estimates obtained from (40) will also account for censoring at zero, by con-
struction.
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Table 2: Benchmark regressions for IMF lending†
(L1 ) (L2 ) (L3 ) (L4 ) (L5 ) (L6 )
Developed 65.544 16.152 63.239 16.152 50.808 16.230
SIG Pressure (10.49)∗∗∗ (5.53)∗∗∗ (7.59)∗∗∗ (5.57)∗∗∗ (10.08)∗∗∗ (5.46)∗∗∗
Developing 0.555 0.698 0.561 0.698 0.538 0.742
SIG Pressure (0.47) (0.32)∗∗ (0.47) (0.27)∗∗∗ (0.45) (0.27)∗∗∗
Developed 0.807 -1.092 0.815 -1.092 1.062 -1.208
Pol Capital (1.14) (0.70) (1.07) (0.62)∗ (1.05) (0.61)∗∗
Developing 0.306 0.291 0.308 0.291 -0.655 0.441
Pol Capital (0.26) (0.16)∗ (0.21) (0.15)∗ (0.28)∗∗ (0.17)∗∗
Domestic 0.093 -0.011 0.093 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003
Interest (0.11) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07)
International -0.639 0.029 -0.639 0.029 -0.366 0.040
Interest (0.22)∗∗∗ (0.13) (0.21)∗∗∗ (0.13) (0.21)∗ (0.12)
Foreign -0.024 -0.085 -0.024 -0.085 -0.065 -0.092
Assets (0.05) (0.04)∗∗ (0.05) (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.03)∗∗∗
Real 0.150 -0.108 0.150 -0.108 0.091 -0.125
GDP (0.06)∗∗ (0.12) (0.08)∗ (0.11) (0.07) (0.11)
Revenue 0.026 0.087 0.026 0.087 0.071 0.102
(0.06) (0.05)∗ (0.08) (0.05)∗ (0.07) (0.05)∗
Real GDP/ 0.117 0.117 0.117
Capita (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Reserves 0.030 0.030 -0.074
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
Quota 1.246 1.246 1.449
(0.13)∗∗∗ (0.12)∗∗∗ (0.17)∗∗∗
Constant 1.773 -17.730 1.773 -17.730 8.156 -20.964
(1.06) (1.52)∗∗∗ (1.10) (1.36)∗∗∗ (1.40)∗∗∗ (2.03)∗∗∗
Selection Equation
Reserves -0.064 -0.143
(0.04)∗ (0.04)∗∗∗
Quota 0.320 0.280
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗
Developing -0.004 -0.004
SIG Pressure (0.05) (0.05)
Developing 0.395 0.259
Pol Capital (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗
Constant -6.731 -4.171
(0.66)∗∗∗ (0.65)∗∗∗
R2 0.620 0.880
Pseudo-R2 0.246 0.539
χ2 80.030 660.405
N 122 121 122 121 1629 1629
† Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗
indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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and significantly related to our measure of developed, φR, and developing, φP ,
special interest pressure, as well as developing political capital, ιP . Furthermore,
developed political capital, ιR, is also negative (and significant) in two speci-
fications. In our preferred specification, (L6 ), all of these political-economic
variables are both statistically and economically significant.
Special interest pressure from developed countries accounts is, by far, the
strongest determinant of IMF lending, ceteris paribus. This relationship, which
is clearly evident at the bivariate level (Figure 3), is also reflected in the re-
gression analyses. In addition, the distribution of special interest pressures in
a developing country also makes a difference in the loan amounts: The greater
the inequality in SIG pressure, the larger the loan package. Overall, the em-
pirical evidence points to significant positive relationship between IMF lending
and special interest pressure in both developed and developing countries.
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Figure 3: IMF crisis lending in terms of developed country special interest
pressure.
Political capital in the developing country also appears to play an important
role in the the agreed amount disbursed. A borrowing country with lesser po-
litical capital at stake (recall, political capital is decreasing in this measure) is
able to secure a larger loan from the IMF; alternatively, with greater audience
costs to backing down, delay results in a smaller loan. Moreover, this effect is
relatively large, influencing about 44 percent of the increase in IMF lending in
our preferred specification.35 The sign of the developed political capital vari-
35Note, also, that this is also a more appealing interpretation of the democracy index, since
the result would otherwise require us to explain why less democratic nations receive more
IMF assistance.
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able is not stable, alternating between positive and negative, depending on the
specification employed. It does, however, enter with a negative coefficient when
it is statistically significant. For the lending nation, therefore, smaller audience
costs from backing down result in smaller loans.
Note that the direction of the other economic variables, when statistically
significant, all enter with economically logical signs. For example, higher in-
ternational interest rates imply that the costs of borrowing are greater, which
then leads to a smaller amount lent. Similarly, larger economies—as measured
by GDP—tend to borrow more. Finally, other technocratic variables, such as a
country’s quota share, also appear to be important in explaining the size of a
loan package.
To test the robustness of our results, we make several perturbations to our
benchmark specifications. In addition, we also employ alternative measures of
some of our key regressors. In general, we regard these results as less insight-
ful, since these alternative specifications typically involve further decreasing the
size of our (already small) sample. Nonetheless, the majority of our benchmark
findings continue to hold, although some of the variables fall out of significance,
depending on the particular specification. These robustness results are summa-
rized in Table 3.
The various specifications are:36 (R1 ) Specification (L6 ) with special inter-
est pressure from only the United States; (R2 ) (L6 ) with special interest pres-
sure only from the European Union; (R3 ) (L6 ) with the change in real GDP
in the selection equation; (R4 ) (L6 ) with previous IMF borrowing history in
the selection equation; (R5 ) (L6 ) with the square of real GDP as an additional
control; (R6 ) (L6 ) with political proximity to the United States as an additional
control; (R7 ) (L4 ) with developing country political capital measured with the
Polity dataset; (R8 ) (L4 ) with developing special interest pressure measured
with corruption data; (R9 ) (L4 ) with the dataset limited to only episodes of
financial crises; and (R10 ) Probit specification with a binary dependent vari-
able for whether a country had a borrowing relationship with the IMF, using
the controls in (L2 ).37,38 On the whole, our findings underscore the importance
of political economy variables in IMF lending, and are complementary to the
36Our preferred baseline regression is (L6 ), for the reasons stated above. However, due to
small sample sizes when we include some of the additional controls, we resorted to the Tobit
specification (L4 ) to obtain convergence on some results.
37We also explored specifications including open-economy variables (such as the real ex-
change rate, terms of trade, and balance of payments) and additional government variables
(such as government expenditures and deficits). In general, these did not qualitatively change
the flavor of our results.
38Our findings for the final Probit specification deserves a little more comment. Here, in con-
trast to the majority of the literature (and to our own results on the amount of disbursement),
we find that developed-country special interest pressure significantly lowers the probability of
securing and IMF loan. We conjecture that this counterintuitive result is due to collinearity
issues between the φR variable and the level of reserves (corr = 0.422, significant at 1%),
which also enters the regression with a negative and significant coefficient. This was not an
issue for our earlier calculations since reserves were an insignificant determinant of lending
amounts. In this regard, the fact that economic variables appear to be more important in the
conclusion of IMF disbursements is consistent with work of Sturm, Berger & de Haan (2005).
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Table 3: Robustness checks for IMF lending†
(R1 ) (R2 ) (R3 ) (R4 ) (R5 )
Developed 8.387 11.994 16.771 16.152 16.230
SIG Pressure (3.27)∗∗ (7.87) (5.58)∗∗∗ (5.26)∗∗∗ (5.46)∗∗∗
Developing 0.850 0.775 0.729 0.698 0.742
SIG Pressure (0.40)∗∗ (0.27)∗∗∗ (0.27)∗∗∗ (0.27)∗∗ (0.27)∗∗∗
Developed -2.037 -1.253 -1.128 -1.092 -1.208
Pol Capital (1.05)∗ (0.62)∗∗ (0.62)∗ (0.62)∗ (0.61)∗∗
Developing 0.751 0.473 0.159 0.291 0.441
Pol Capital (4.59) (0.18)∗∗∗ (0.19) (0.15)∗ (0.17)∗∗
χ2 678.313 615.992 704.755 886.483 660.405
N 1628 1628 1435 1629 1629
(R6 ) (R7 ) (R8 ) (R9 ) (R10 )
Developed 16.634 93.683 15.067 11.574 -11.414
SIG Pressure (8.05)∗∗ (12.10)∗∗∗ (7.02)∗∗ (5.68)∗∗ (5.53)∗∗
Developing 0.851 0.215 0.136 0.026 0.107
SIG Pressure (0.39)∗∗ (0.53) (0.21) (0.49) (0.28)
Developed -2.038 0.185 -1.453 -0.767 -0.743
Pol Capital (1.04)∗ (1.40) (1.10) (0.88) (0.59)
Developing 0.749 -0.405 -0.260 0.455 -0.103
Pol Capital (4.57) (0.28) (0.24) (0.21)∗∗ (0.14)
pseudo-R2 231.844 0.276 0.489 0.697 0.089
χ2 1629 58.22
N 73 78 46 617
† Notes: Other controls from the benchmark models were included, but not re-
ported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent
level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance
at 1 percent level.
existing literature (Faccio et al. 2005; Oatley & Yackee 2004).
5 Interpretation and Policy Implications
There are important caveats that underlie our empirical findings in the previous
section. Due to the specific functional forms assumed for the structural econo-
metric equations, as well the other simplifying assumptions made, the preceding
tests qualify as necessary, but not sufficient, investigations of the theoretical
model.
To illustrate this, consider the micro-level tests of how the financial crisis
impacted sectors of the economy differently. While the empirical evidence sug-
gests that politically-organized sectors performed better in the crisis, which may
well be due to special interest politicking, political organization in a sector may
also be driven by more fundamental determinants, such as higher levels of pro-
ductivity. Since more productive sectors are also more likely to be organized,
these sectors would then be more likely to recover quickly in the event of a crisis.
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Moreover, as alluded to in the theoretical model, it may be possible that certain
productive sectors necessary for the economy’s continued viability and recovery
end up being supported by government policy, irrespective of lobbying contri-
butions. In that case, we might also observe that these sectors perform better
in a crisis. Thus, political organization is merely a reflection of these sectors’
comparative advantages, rather than a proof that special interest politics are
the raison d’etre for their superior performance.39
Moreover, while it is certainly implied by the general equilibrium nature of
our theoretical model, the connection between organized sectors and organized
workers cannot automatically be assumed in reality. If workers are not orga-
nized, then even if the industry is politically organized, workers in that industry
will not collect rents. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that there ap-
pears to be a statistically significant effect of spillovers for workers in industries
protected from the crisis by political rents, either through direct transfers or—
more likely—indirectly via relatively higher levels of employment and hours
worked. Moreover, the consistency of our findings with the existing empirical
literature on the microeconomic impact of crises suggests that special interest
politics may be an important mechanism that drives post-crisis redistribution.
Indeed, our findings provide further corroboration of the recent work of Faccio
et al. (2005), which finds that government bailouts—especially IMF or World
Bank-financed ones—tend to be more likely for politically connected firms.
Similarly, the tests of IMF lending primarily make the point that, in addi-
tion to economic factors, both special interest as well as domestic constituent
pressure are potentially important determinants of crisis lending decisions by
the IMF. While the reported coefficients are intuitively appealing, we should be
careful not to draw excessively strong conclusions about the exact magnitude
(and even the direction) of each point estimate. This is primarily because our
theoretical model maps the optimal concession time of each country to lending
amounts in a relatively loose manner. As before, the aim is to demonstrate the
importance, not the primacy, of political-economic factors in IMF lending. Ul-
timately, we view our findings as a complement to the existing literature, which
tends to find that IMF lending decisions are influenced by special interest poli-
tics as well as political bargaining.40
Given these caveats, it is nonetheless interesting to consider our findings in a
wider context. Subsection 4.1 suggests that special interests are potential ben-
39Note that the more direct suggestion that certain sectors, such as exporters, could perform
better in the crisis due to the devaluation is insufficient to drive our results. For this to be
the case, export industries need to be exactly the same as politically-organized sectors. This
is clearly not the case, since in both datasets organized sectors include nontradable service
sectors. Indeed, it is difficult to construe, ex ante, any other way in which these sectors may
be somehow related. A related argument, that certain sectors may simply be more productive
or face smaller income fluctuations in general (and hence perform better irrespective of the
crisis), is also inadequate, since we have included sectoral dummies.
40Moreover, the recent work by Sturm et al. (2005), which finds that politics affects the
conclusion of IMF agreements—but not the disbursement of IMF credits—can be seen in this
light. Since the lending amounts used in our empirical study reflects agreed, as opposed to
disbursed amounts, our findings offer additional justification for how politics are important in
the conclusion of negotiations involving the IMF.
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eficiaries in a financial crisis. This places the finding of post-crisis rich-to-poor
transfers (Baldacci et al. 2002; Halac & Schmukler 2004) within a specific politi-
cal framework: The rich are getting richer because they are politically organized.
Observed post-crisis income distributions are therefore a result of domestic (spe-
cial interest) politics, rather than a phenomenon unique to financial crises. As
in the case of redistribution in more tranquil periods, post-crisis redistribution
is the outcome of domestic groups wrangling over a fixed economic pie.
In addition, the critics who argue that the IMF is an instrument of devel-
oped country special interests (Perkins 2004; Stiglitz 2002) may indeed have a
case. Subsection 4.2 implies that IMF lending is contingent on these special
interest pressures. More precisely, lending amounts appear to be influenced by
the extent to which a borrowing country’s special interests have asymmetric
political power. Moreover, with lending amounts increasing with greater asym-
metry of developing special interest pressures, one could credibly argue that one
purpose of IMF bailouts is to rescue beleaguered banks and favored industries in
borrowing countries, who in turn pay off loans extended to them previously by
global banks. While developing country taxpayers are certainly one loser in this
system of redistribution accompanied by international transfers, one cannot, ex
ante, rule out welfare losses by developed country taxpayers either.
However, this is only part of the picture. The responsiveness of policymakers
to political pressures from domestic constituents means that, in a financial crisis,
borrowing countries tend to borrow less, while lending countries tend to extend
larger loans. While the specific reasons for this result remain unmodeled, what
is clear from the empirical analysis is that governments do not have free rein
over major foreign economic policy decisions. As first argued by Putnam (1988),
general domestic political support does matter in the calculus of bargaining.
Should, then, the IMF be abolished, as some of its critics suggest? This,
surely, is a drastic measure. The IMF serves potentially useful functions in
smoothing the wheels of international finance. Just as most economies would
not consider completely abolishing their central bank, the lender of last resort
function of the IMF is, arguably, a reasonable one. Other more tempered criti-
cisms of the IMF, however, may deserve consideration.
One criticism is that the IMF merely exercises a “one size fits all” policy.
More specifically, its policy recommendations are said to not adequately con-
sider their impact on the poor. For example, one view holds that the IMF’s
policy recommendations are too rigid, and its policies bring about undue hard-
ship on economies already in crisis (Stiglitz 2002). The solution to this would
then be to relax conditionality. However, the other—opposing—view is that the
IMF should maintain a tighter leash on borrowing governments to ensure that
disbursements are properly allocated to those most affected by the crisis—that
is, it should strengthen country selectivity and conditionality (Calomiris 2003).
Our research is agnostic on this point. We have chosen to model conditionality
and program participation as empirical realities. Given these assumptions, our
finding that post-crisis redistribution tends to favor certain politically-organized
groups may imply that greater attention needs to be paid to the actual recipi-
ents of IMF funds. However, to the extent that these disbursements may have
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been authorized by donor governments responding to their own special interests,
the problem would have deeper structural roots that are not easily resolved by
a mere change in conditionality requirements. In any case—as has often been
claimed by the Fund itself—beyond its advisory capacity, the IMF has no power
to formulate economic policy for a client country. Still, to curb the likelihood
of asymmetric bargaining power between governments, the recent calls for ex-
panding participation in democratic processes within international institutions
(Grant & Keohane 2005) seem like a step in the right direction.
Another common critique is that the IMF has lost its way, straying from
its original mandate of maintaining global financial stability. In one camp, it
has been accused of being ignorant of its role as an organization that enables
despots and dictators in developing countries to sustain their regimes (Smith,
Jr. 1984; Vreeland 2003); thus, it is too poorly managed, and is in need of refo-
cusing. On the other, it has also been charged with being a tool of the United
States and other developed nations, bent on oppressing poor countries (Perkins
2004) and, inadvertently, fostering conditions that encourage speculation and
moral hazard against these countries (Calomiris 2003). In this case, the IMF
has become, in a sense, too “well” managed, to a point where it is now a cog in
the global “corporatocracy.” Our work here reiterates the political environment
in which the IMF operates, and how it is a forum that merely represents the ul-
timate interests of its shareholders. To their credit, staffers at the Fund seem to
be aware of this fundamental constraint (Blustein 2001). It would appear that
the best way forward would be to limit as far as possible the aims and scope
of the Fund to its core functions—of surveillance and financial and technical
assistance—and hence avoid the most flagrant abuses that would arise when it
becomes involved in matters of trade, growth, and poverty. Just as national
central banks require independence from political pressures to enhance their
credibility, international financial institutions such as the IMF can do the same
by insulating themselves—as far as possible—from functions that compromise
their integrity as independent actors. This could narrow the possibility that
international institutions are created and maintained for the purpose of max-
imizing domestic political support while effecting wealth transfers from other
states.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the impact of political-economic pressures in
post-financial crisis resolution. To this end, we have marshaled both theory and
empirical evidence to demonstrate that such influences are both real and signifi-
cant. In the theoretical model that underlies our analysis, we have sought to clar-
ify the key economic (levels of borrowing, interest rates, production outcomes) as
well as political-economic (taxes, special interest organization, political capital)
determinants that are important in the formation of post-crisis resolution policy.
Moreover, our framework has also allowed us to explore how post-crisis redistri-
bution may be influenced by different channels: Between politically-unorganized
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taxpayers in both developed and developing countries, and other organized, spe-
cial interest groups—all demanding their pound of flesh.
The empirical evidence that we present is also consistent with the key hy-
potheses of our theory. Using household consumption data for two countries
that were gathered before and after financial crises, we find—after controlling
for other relevant household-specific characteristics—that politically-organized
groups tend to face smaller consumption declines (or even consumption in-
creases) after a crisis. In our examination of IMF crisis lending patterns, we
find that both the asymmetry of special interest pressures, as well as politi-
cal capital in the form of audience costs, are relevant as explanatory variables
in regressions of Fund lending amounts. This is so even after we account for
econometric issues, such as censoring, selection, and omitted variables.
We are careful not to cast our results as conclusive evidence that political
economy is the final word. The present study does have several shortcomings,
which naturally point to areas for future research. In our theoretical model, we
have neglected the impact of election processes and post-crisis election dynamics
on our results. In addition, our assumption concerning the absence of imperfec-
tions in international capital markets is perhaps extreme. While we believe that
our general findings will withstand such extensions, a more deliberate consid-
eration of such issues may be warranted. For example, access to international
capital markets appears to be important in at least some crisis episodes, such
as that of Argentina. Explicitly accounting for such distinctions may allow us
to peek into the relative power among politically-organized groups. Similarly,
adding specific electoral mechanisms to lobbying processes may dilute (although
it will not eliminate) some of the leverage that special interest groups currently
hold in our model (Grossman & Helpman 2001). Empirically, looking at post-
crisis redistribution outcomes using other samples—for example, by repeating
the exercise with the Townsend Thai dataset between 1997 and 1998/99, or by
conducting pseudo-panel regressions on Mexico’s ENIGH survey data between
the years 1994 and 1996—may help further corroborate some of our findings.
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A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The pre-crisis level of optimal consumption for each
group is given by (11). With the specific timing of the redistribution given
by (20), pre-crisis consumption reduces to an expression without a government
transfer. For the developed nation, this is c˜iR =
r
1+r
[
(1 + r) biR +
(
1+r
r
)
yR
]
.
Post-crisis consumption will be (11), but adjusted by pre-crisis net borrow-
ing (1 + r)T+1−t biR (recall Assumption 3). Taking the difference in these two
terms, keeping in mind the difference in base times, yields r∆BiR+(1 + r) ∆y
i
R+
r
ν(1+r)g
i∗
R , where B
i
R ≡
[
(1 + r)T−t − 1
]
bih,t. Substituting (26) and the specific
functional form for the debt function assumed earlier, and rearranging, we then
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obtain the expression on the right side of the equality (for the developed coun-
try). A similar calculation for the developing country then yields the assertion
of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the proposition, we need to establish two lem-
mata.
Lemma 1 (Consumption during crisis). Optimal consumption for a group i in
country h = P, R in the absence of international borrowing at a time S ∈ [t, T ]
is characterized by
cˆiR,S
(
giR; yR
)
= 1ΨR,S Xˆ
i
R,S
(
giR; yR
)
,
cˆiP,S
(
giP ; yP
)
=
∫ ∗P
−¯ ϕ (P |aP < 0) · 1ΨP0,S Xˆ
i
P,S
(
giP ; yP = 0
)
d+∫ 0
∗P
ϕ (P |∆aP < 0) · 1ΨP1,S Xˆ
i
P,S
(
giP ; yP > 0
)
d,
(A.1)
where ϕ() is the distribution function of the productivity shock, ∗is the critical
value of the shock that renders the level of productivity negative, and
ΨR,S ≡
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
[
(1 + r¯∗R)
v−S
1 + αaR,Skα−1R,v
]
,
ΨP0,S ≡
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
(1 + r¯∗P )
v−S
,
ΨP1,S ≡
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
[
aαP,t (1 + r¯
∗
P )
v−S
1 + α (1 + ρP )
(v−S)(1−α)
]
,
XˆiR,S
(
giR; yR
) ≡ giR,t + (T − S) · ( αr¯∗R
) 1
α
· yR,t,
XˆiP,S
(
giP |yP = 0
) ≡ giP,t,
XˆiP,S
(
giP |yP > 0
) ≡ y(α−1)/αP,t [giP,t + (T − S) · ΛP,S · yP,t] ,
ΛP,S ≡ 1− (1 + ρP )
(T−S)(1−α)
1− (1 + ρh)(1−α)
.
Proof. With the loss of international private borrowing as an intertemporal
smoothing technology, each group will resort to capital accumulation as the only
method of consumption smoothing. The optimization problem therefore reduces
to maximizing utility with respect to domestic capital only. The Lagrangian for
this case is:
L = Et
T∑
s=t
βs−t
{
u
[
gih,t + yh,s − kh,s+1 + kh,s
]
−ζh,s [ah,sf (kh,s)− yh,s]
}
, h = R,P. (A.2)
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In this case, (5) does not obtain, since we cannot substitute (3) to simplify.
Instead, the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions in this case are:[
1 + αEt
(
ah,t+1k
α−1
h,t+1
)]
·
[
Etc
i
h,t+1
cih,t
]
= 1 + r¯∗h, h = R,P,
yh,t
(
1 + cih,t + ζh,t
)
= 0, h = R,P,
ζh,t
(
yh,t − ah,tkαh,t
)
= 0, h = R,P,
(A.3)
where r¯∗ is the domestic (financial autarky) interest rate corrected for condi-
tional covariance, analogous to r∗, and the second and third lines list comple-
mentary slackness conditions. The Euler then implies
Etc
i
h,s = Ωh,s|tc
i
h,t, h = R,P, (A.4)
where Ωh,s|t ≡
s∏
v=t+1
[
(1+r¯∗h)
v−t
1+αah,t[(1+ρh)v−t/kh,v]1−α
]
is the discount factor for date
s consumption at date t ≤ s. Iterative substitution yields optimal consumption
in the absence of international borrowing at time S ∈ [t, T ] given by
cˆih,S =
gih,t +
∑T
s=S yh,s∑T
s=S Ωh,s|S
, h = R,P. (A.5)
We now consider each country in turn. For the developing country, we have
assumed P,s = P,t ∀s ∈ [S, T ]. In accord with (19), then, there are two possible
cases: (a) The shock is large enough that it crosses a threshold level ∗ such that
productivity becomes negative; (b) The shock is negative, but only the change in
productivity is negative. For case (a), this violates the nonnegativity constraint
in (A.3), and so we have a corner solution where aP,s = yP,s = 0 ∀s ∈ [S, T ]. For
case (b), aP,skαP,s = yP,t > 0 ∀s ∈ [S, T ]. Given the distributional assumptions,
we then have
cˆiP,S
(
giP
)
=
∫ ∗P
−¯ ϕ (P |aP < 0) · CˆiP,S
(
giP |yP = 0
)
+∫ 0
∗P
ϕ (P |∆aP < 0) · CˆiP,S
(
giP |yP > 0
) (A.6)
where ϕ () is the distribution function of the shock (with support [−, ]); and
define CˆiP,S
(
giP , b
i
P |yP = 0
) ≡ (1+r)biP,t+giP,t∑T
s=S
∏s
v=S+1(1+r¯∗P )
v−S , CˆiP,S
(
giP , b
i
P |yP > 0
) ≡
(1+r)biP,t+g
i
P,t+aP,tΛP,S
∑T
s=S k
α
P,s∑S
s=t ΩP,s|S
, with ΛP,S ≡ 1−(1+ρP )
(T−S)(1−α)
1−(1+ρP )(1−α) . To proceed,
we make an additional assumption.
Assumption 5 (Restructuring Constraint). qP,s = 0 ∀s ∈ [t, T ].
In particular, this restriction on domestic investment may be rationalized
as an externally-imposed IMF conditionality during the crisis period (through
the impact of prohibitively high interest rates); alternatively, it can be regarded
as domestically-induced constraints that arise due to the inability to pin down
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proper investment vehicles during the restructuring period. This assumption
then implies that kP,s+1 = kP,s ∀s ∈ [t, T ], and hence rewrite
CˆiP,S
(
giP |yP > 0
)
=
giP,t + (T − S) · ΛP,S · yP,t
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
[
(1+r¯∗P )
v−S
1+α(yP,S/kP,S)(1+ρP )
(v−S)(1−α)
] .
For the developed country, productivity continues to follow the process stipu-
lated in Assumption 1. Thus,
cˆiR,S
(
giR
)
=
giR,t +
[
aR,t + R2 · (T − S) (T − S + 1)
] ·∑Ts=S kαR,s
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
[
(1+r¯∗R)
v−S
1+αaR,Sk
α−1
R,v
] , (A.7)
However, we have assumed that R,s = 0 ∀ [S, T ], and so this can be re-expressed
(after some algebra) as
cˆiR,S
(
giR
)
=
giR,t + (T − S) ·
(
α
r¯∗R
) 1
α · yR,t
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
[
(1+r¯∗R)
v−S
1+αaR,Sk
α−1
R,v
] .
Gathering these results then give us the crisis-period optimal consumption
group i in each country at time S ∈ [t, T ] as
cˆiR,S
(
giR; yR
)
= 1ΨR,S Xˆ
i
R,S
(
giR; yR
)
,
cˆiP,S
(
giP ; yP
)
=
∫ ∗P
−¯ ϕ (P |aP < 0) · 1ΨP0,S Xˆ
i
P,S
(
giP ; yP = 0
)
d+∫ 0
∗P
ϕ (P |∆aP < 0) · 1ΨP1,S Xˆ
i
P,S
(
giP ; yP > 0
)
d,
(A.8)
where
ΨR,S ≡
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
[
(1 + r¯∗R)
v−S
1 + αaR,Skα−1R,v
]
,
ΨP0,S ≡
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
(1 + r¯∗P )
v−S
,
ΨP1,S ≡
T∑
s=S
s∏
v=S+1
[
aαP,t (1 + r¯
∗
P )
v−S
1 + α (1 + ρP )
(v−S)(1−α)
]
,
XˆiR,S
(
giR; yR
) ≡ giR,t + (T − S) · ( αr¯∗R
) 1
α
· yR,t,
XˆiP,S
(
giP |yP = 0
) ≡ giP,t,
XˆiP,S
(
giP |yP > 0
) ≡ y(α−1)/αP,t [giP,t + (T − S) · ΛP,S · yP,t] .
Note that these are all completely determined at time S.
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This equation says that the optimal level of consumption for each group
at a point S ∈ [t, T ] during the financial crisis is dependent on the present
discounted value of its private level of borrowing just before the crisis, the
government disbursement received, and the stream of crisis-level income. Note,
in particular, that if there is any government transfer to a particular group i, it
will be used for the purposes of consumption smoothing.
Corollary 1 (Welfare during crisis). Gross welfare for a group i in the absence
of international borrowing at a time S ∈ [t, T ] is given by
Wˆ iR,S
(
giR; yR
)
= cˆiR,S
(
giR; yR
)− τˆR,
Wˆ iP,S
(
giP ; yP
)
= cˆiP,S
(
giP ; yP
)− τˆP , (A.9)
where τˆh is given by Nhτˆh =
∑Ih
i=1N
i
hg
i
h for h = R,P .
We now use the corollary of Lemma 1 to derive the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Optimal expected welfare). Under the conditions given by Assump-
tion 4, the optimal consumption time yields the optimal expected welfare for each
country given by
EWG∗R (g
∗
P , T
∗
P ) =
3
4
IR∑
i=1
{
aR ·
[
δ +
1 + αaR
2 + αaR + r¯∗R
]}
+
1
1− δ
IR∑
i=1
{
1
ν
[
ωRλR
ωR−1 + φ
i
R
ωR[1+ωR(λR−1)]
1−ωR − 11+r
]
+ 1+rr yR + (1 + r)
2
biR
}
+
1
4
(1 + δ) ιR,
EWG∗P (g
∗
P , T
∗
P ) =
3
16
IP∑
i=1
{
y
2α−1
α
P ·
[
δ +
1 + α (1 + ρ)1−α
1 + α (1 + ρ)1−α + aαP (1 + r¯
∗
P )
]}
+
1
1− δ
IP∑
i=1
 rν(1+r)
[
ωPλP
ωP−1 + φ
i
P
ωP [1+ωP (λP−1)]
1−ωP − 11+r
]
+ rr−ρ
(r∗P−αρ)
r∗P
yP + (1 + r)
2
biP

+
1
4
(1 + δ) ιP .
(A.10)
Proof. By the conditions listed in Assumption 4, we are effectively setting the
number of periods of the crisis to two; this implies either T ∗P = t+1 or T
∗
R = t+1,
with this optimal concession time depending on the values of the other primitives
in the model. The two possible cases are when the developing country concedes
first, and when the developed country concedes first. We consider these in turn.
Substituting the values in Assumption 4 into (A.1), we obtain (after some
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algebra)
cˆiP,t =
1 + α (1 + ρ)1−α · y
α−1
α +1
P,t
4 + 4α (1 + ρ)1−α + 4aαP,t
(
1 + r¯∗P,t
) ,
cˆiP,t+1 =
1
4
y
α−1
α +1
P,t .
(A.11)
From Assumption 4(a) and (b), we also have τˆs = 0 ∀s ∈ [t, t + 1], and hence
cˆiP,t = Wˆ
i
P,t and cˆ
i
P,t+1 = Wˆ
i
P,t+1. Substituting these values into (28) and (29),
followed by (24) and (24), and finally recalling the functional form of DR and
DP , yields the equations
WLP,t =
IP∑
i=1

[
1 + α (1 + ρ)1−α
]
· y
2α−1
α
P,t
4 + 4α (1 + ρ)1−α + 4aαP,t
(
1 + r¯∗P,t
)
+ δ
IP∑
i=1
y
2α−1
α
P,t
4
+
∞∑
s=t+2
δs−(t+2)
IP∑
i=1

r
1+r
1
ν
[
ωPλP
ωP−1 + φ
i
P
ωP [1+ωP (λP−1)]
1−ωP − 11+r
]
+ rr−ρ
(r∗P,t−αρ)
r∗P,t
yP,t + (1 + r)
2
biP,t

WFP,t =
IP∑
i=1

[
1 + α (1 + ρ)1−α
]
· y
2α−1
α
P,t
4 + 4α (1 + ρ)1−α + 4aαP,t
(
1 + r¯∗P,t
)
+ δ
IP∑
i=1
y
2α−1
α
P,t
4
+ ιP
+
∞∑
s=t+2
δs−(t+2)
IP∑
i=1

r
ν(1+r)
[
ωPλP
ωP−1 + φ
i
P
ωP [1+ωP (λP−1)]
1−ωP − 11+r
]
+ rr−ρ
(r∗P,t−αρ)
r∗P,t
yP,t + (1 + r)
2
biP,t

WFP,t+1 =
IP∑
i=1
y
2α−1
α
P,t
4
+ διP
+
∞∑
s=t+2
δs−(t+2)
IP∑
i=1

r
ν(1+r)
[
ωPλP
ωP−1 + φ
i
P
ωP [1+ωP (λP−1)]
1−ωP − 11+r
]
+ rr−ρ
(r∗P,t−αρ)
r∗P,t
yP,t + (1 + r)
2
biP,t

(A.12)
Substituting the values in (A.12) into (30), simplifying, and dropping time sub-
scripts (since these are all determined at time t) gives us the second part of
the lemma. Now, consider the case for the developed country. The values in
Assumption 4 give
cˆiR,t =
aR,t [1 + αaR,t]
2 + αaR,t + r¯∗R,t
,
cˆiR,t+1 = aR,t.
(A.13)
From Assumption 4(a) and (b), we also have τˆs = 0 ∀s ∈ [t, t + 1], and hence
cˆiR,t = Wˆ
i
R,t and cˆ
i
R,t+1 = Wˆ
i
R,t+1. Repeating the steps as outlined above gives
us the first part of the lemma.
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The proof for the proposition follows from Lemma 2 and (33), and the specific
functional form of the debt function assumed earlier.
A.2 Extensions
A.2.1 Changes in Post-Crisis Group Power Structure
This addendum extends the common agency model of Bernheim & Whinston
(1986) and Dixit et al. (1997) and derives, from first principles, the way that an
exogenous shock impacts the equilibrium contribution schedule. We begin by
establishing the results for the general case, before applying it to the context of
the model developed in Section 3.
Consider a policymaker with welfare WG (g,L), where g and L are vectors
that correspond to policies and contributions, respectively. There are a total of
I groups, which possess welfare given by W i
(
g, li
)
, where li is the contribution
level that has a schedule given by the (assumed) globally truthful
Li
(
g; ηi
)
= min
{
L¯i (g) ,max
[
0,W i (g)− ηi (yi)]} , (A.14)
where L¯ih (g) ≡ sup
{
Li (g)
}
is the upper limit of feasible contributions that
group i is willing to undertake, subject to its net welfare remaining positive,
and ηi
(
yi
)
is its reservation utility, which is dependent on its income yi. We
assume that ∂G/∂li ≥ 0 and ∂W i/∂li ≤ 0 for every i, and ∂ηi/∂yi > 0.41
Let there be a subset J ⊆ I of groups that are organized and hence en-
gage in positive contributions. For a political equilibrium, we require: (a)
gi to belong to the policymaker’s best-response set to the list of contribu-
tion schedules L (g); (b) There does not exist a contribution amount lˆi ≥ 0
and a policy vector gˆi such that W i
(
gˆi, lˆi
)
> W i
(
gi, Li
(
gi
))
as well as
WG
[
gi, L1
(
gˆi
)
, . . . , lˆi, . . . LK
(
gˆi
)] ≥WG [g−i,L−i (g−i)], where K is the to-
tal number of organized groups, and the superscript −i indicates the absence
of element i. We denote the equilibrium policy and contribution vectors by g◦
and l◦.
Now, consider an exogenous negative shock,  < 0, to the income (and hence
welfare) of group i. For simplicity, let income be constant such that yi = y ∀i.
This then implies that ηi′ − ηi = ∆ηi < 0, which in turn implies that
Li
(
g; ηi′
) ≥ Li (g; ηi) .
For a given constant level of welfare, therefore, there are now potentially
groups for which the upper limit of feasible contributions—the term on the left
of (A.14)—is now higher than the group’s welfare net of its reservation utility
41This assumption may be rationalized as follows: Defining reservation utility as the base
utility that corresponds to income gross of borrowing and government taxes/transfers, a nega-
tive (positive) shock to output then reduces (increases) this base level. Intuitively, an increase
(reduction) in income raises (lowers) the opportunity cost of pursuing outside options, which
implies a positive relationship between income and reservation utility.
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(which is the group’s welfare if it participates in the political game—the term
on the right). This is illustrated in Figure A.1. The indifference curve WGWG
is drawn such that it corresponds to the case where there are zero contributions
from group i (which would pass through the point g−ij , which is the policy that
would result in the absence of contributions from group i). Now, let there be
a group for which, prior to the shock, the upper limit of feasible contributions
dominates the welfare gain from being able to influence policy, but, post-shock,
will now participate in the political contribution game. The indifference curves
that correspond to these are the dashed line W iW i and the solid W i′W i′ (with
the corresponding critical values of positive welfare-inducing policy being gj
and g′j , respectively).
42 Therefore, after the shock, groups that formerly did not
participate in the lobbying process now have an incentive to do so. This implies
that IP ⊇ J ′P ⊇ JP . For one such group i, this leads to contributions that are
equivalent to the equilibrium level ci◦, thus yielding the equilibrium policy g◦j .
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Figure A.1: Changes in compensating contribution schedules.
Note that, since the basic structure of the game remains unchanged (save
for a different number of politically-organized groups), all the key findings that
have been established for to the original Bernheim & Whinston (1986) model
continue to hold. In particular, the truthful political equilibria will continue to
have both joint efficiency and coalition proofness properties.
We now contextualize the ideas developed above to our model, for the devel-
oping country. Let group welfare be given by (15), and policymaker welfare by
(14). Substituting the shock t < 0 into (8), we obtain (19). Define reservation
utility for group i as
ηiP,t ≡W iP,t
(
yP,t | biP = 0, giP = 0, τ iP = 0
)
,
which then yields
ηiP,t =
r
r − ρ ·
r − αP
r∗P
aP,tk
α
P,t. (A.15)
42Note that we have chosen to illustrate the function L¯i (g) as a curve, although this could
well be linear.
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Due to the crisis, therefore, (A.15) implies that
∆ηiP,t =
r
r − ρ ·
r − αP
r∗P
[
aP,tk
α
P,t − aP,t−1kαP,t−1
] ≤ 0. (A.16)
Taking the time difference of (16) and substituting (A.16) then gives us
∆LiP,t
(
g; ηi
) ≥ 0. (A.17)
Thus, for a given welfare level, the shock decreases the reservation utility ηi
and may lead to an increase in net welfare such that compensating contributions
for group i are now positive. If this falls within the feasible set, the group will
have an incentive to participate in the contributions game. We can thus expect,
for t sufficiently large, that there will be more groups that engage in political
contributions, and so JP,t ⊂ JP,t−1.
Essentially, in this simple extension of the model, the shock leads to a change
in the power structure of developing country special interests. Intuitively, this
could occur for several reasons, as elaborated upon in the text. The crisis lowers
the opportunity cost for groups to participate in collective action, since there
are stronger positive selective incentives to do so. In addition, there are now a
greater number of smaller groups, that face less free-riding problems in general.
The political power structure is altered as a result.
A.2.2 Closed Form Solution in Continuous Time
This addendum recasts the model in continuous time and solves for the parame-
ters and variables that determine optimal concession. For tractability, we leave
some of the variables in implicit form, since re-expressing them does not lend
much more insight into the solution. In particular, define
ΨR ≡ Ψ (r¯∗R, aR, kR;α) ; ΨP0 ≡ Ψ (r¯∗P ) ; ΨP1 ≡ Ψ (r¯∗P , aP , kP ;α, ρP ) ;
XiR ≡ X
(
giR, b
i
R, r, yR
)
;XiP ≡ X
(
giP , b
i
P , r, r¯
∗
P , yP ; ρP , α
)
;
XˆiR ≡ Xˆ
(
giR, b
i
R, r, yR
)
; XˆiP (yP = 0) ≡ Xˆ
(
giR, b
i
R, r
)
;
XˆiP (yP > 0) ≡ Xˆ
(
giP , b
i
P , r, yP ; ρP
)
.
Consider first the developing country. In continuous time, the payoffs to
leadership are
WLP (g
∗
P , TP ) =
∫ TP
s=t
e−δ(s−t)WˆP ds+ e−δ(TP−t)
∫ ∞
s=TP
e−δ(s−TP )WP ds,
(A.18)
where WˆP ≡
∑
i∈IP Wˆ
i
P , WP ≡
∑
i∈IP W
i
P , and δ is the governments’ discount
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factor. Payoffs to being a follower are
WFP (g
∗
P , TP ) =
∫ TP
s=t
e−δ(s−t)WˆP ds+ e−δ(TP−t)
∫ ∞
s=TP
e−δ(s−TP )WP ds
+ e−δ(TP−t)ιP
= WLP (g
∗
P , TP ) + e
−δ(TP−t)ιP ,
(A.19)
where ι is political capital. Let the probability of concession by country h is
captured by the (smooth) distribution function Ξh (Th), with the associated
density ξh (Th). Expected welfare is then
EWGP (g
∗
P , TP ) = [1− ΞR (TP )]WLP (g∗P , TP ) +
∫ TP
s=t
ξR(s)WFP (g
∗
P , s) ds.
(A.20)
Differentiating with respect to optimal concession time TP yields the expres-
sion
[1− ΞR (TP )] ·WLPT − ξR (TP )WLP (g∗P , TP ) + ξR (TP )
[
WLP (g
∗
P , TP ) + ιP
]
= 0,
(A.21)
where
WLPT =
∑
i∈IP
{e−δ(TP−t)
[∫ ∗P
−¯
ϕ (P |aP < 0) e−ΨP0,TP XˆiP,TP (yP = 0) d
]
+ e−δ(TP−t)
[∫ 0
∗P
ϕ (P |∆aP < 0) e−ΨP1,TP XˆiP,TP (yP > 0) d
]
+
∫ TP
s=t
e−δ(s−t)
∫ 0
∗P
ϕ (P |∆aP < 0) e−ΨP1,syP,TP d ds
+
∫ TP
s=t
e−δ(s−t)
∫ 0
∗P
ϕ (P |∆aP < 0) XˆiP,TP (yP > 0) ΨP1,TP e−ΨP1,s d ds
− δe−δ(TP−t)
∫ ∞
s=TP
e−δ(s−TP )
(
XiP,s − τP,s
)
ds
− e−δ(TP−t)
[
(XP,TP − τP,TP )−
∫
s=TP∞
δe−δ(s−TP ) (XP,s − τP,s ds)
]
},
which is quite impenetrable. To gain some intuition, it is therefore useful to
examine (A.21). Rearranging, obtain
WLPT =
ξR (TP )
1− ΞR (TP ) · ιP .
At the margin, the expected cost to the developing country of conceding—
which is the instantaneous probability that the developed country concedes at
time TP , conditional on the developing country not having yet conceded at
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this time (or the hazard rate, which is the first term on the right hand side)
multiplied by the benefits to the developing country not conceding but reaping
the gains from political capital (the second term)—must equal to the expected
gain to her of waiting another instant before conceding. Hence, this expression
equates the cost of waiting to concede, to the benefits of doing so.
Without knowing the specific distribution ΞR (TP ), it is not possible to di-
rectly use (A.21) to derive an equilibrium concession time T ∗P . We will therefore
assume that both countries concede according to the same function, T (ιh).
This then suggests that, for a particular time Tˆ , the probability that coun-
try h concedes before this time is the probability that the political capital is
less than the associated ιˆ, a function given by F (ιˆ). This allows us to write
Ξh(Tˆ ) = Ξh(T (ιˆ)) = F (ιˆ). Differentiating this yields ξh (T ) ·T ′ (ι) = f (ι) ∀ T .
Plug this into (A.21) to obtain the differential equation
T ′ (ιP ) =
fP (TP )
1− FP (TP ) ·
ιP
WLPT
. (A.22)
Together with the boundary condition T (0) = 0, we can then proceed to
solve for the optimal concession time for the developing country. This will be a
function of primitives given by
T ∗P = T (φP , ιP , r, r¯
∗
P , bP , yP , τP ;ωP , λP , ρP , α) .
A similar process will also result in the optimal concession time for the
developed country, given by
T ∗R = T (φR, ιR, r, r¯
∗
R, bR, yR, τR;ωR, λR, ρR, α) .
Equilibrium time of bargaining will be that of the first country to concede,
T ∗ = min {T ∗P , T ∗R}, and the equilibrium debt function will be
NPDP (g∗, T ∗) = −NRDR (g∗, T ∗) , (A.23)
which in turn is a function of the primitives
NhDh (g∗, T ∗) = NhDh (φP ,φR, ιh, r, r¯
∗
h, bh, yh, τh;ωP , ωR, λP , λR, ρP , α) .
A.3 Data
This appendix details the data used for the empirical section of the paper.
A.3.1 Bulgarian Household Data
With regard to core variables, the dummy variables for durable asset owner-
ship comprise 19 different household durable goods that constitute household
assets, which can potentially be bought or sold for consumption smoothing.
These include, among other things, a gas stove (DA1), a manual washing ma-
chine (DA6), a dryer (DA7), a dishwasher (DA8), and a color television (DA11).
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Likewise, the dummies for business asset ownership and agricultural asset own-
ership comprise, respectively, 14 and 18 different assets owned by a particular
household. Examples of these in each category include office equipment (BA3),
medical supplies (BA7), and tools (BA16), and a tractor (AA1), a plow (AA3),
and a cart (AA13). The dummy variables for household composition involve
dummies for whether the head of household was: A male (female) up to age
34; a male (female) aged between 35 and 54, and a male (female) between the
ages of 55 and 99. In addition, dummies included whether there were children
in the household under 4 years of age; and children between the ages of 5 and
14. The health dummy took on a value of unity if there was any chronic dis-
ease in the household in the past 12 months, and null otherwise. Population
group comprised two dummies, one for Bulgars (ETH1) and another for Roma
(gypsies) (ETH2). The geographical district control added dummies to each of
the following regions: Sofia City (DIST1), Bourgas (DIST2), Varna (DIST3),
Lovech (DIST4), Montana (DIST5), Plovdiv (DIST6), Russe (DIST7), Sofia
Region (DIST8), and Haskovo (DIST9). Finally, household size is a discrete
measure of the number of resident household members.
There were also several constructed variables. The average years of house-
hold education was constructed by, first, dropping individuals that were still
schooling at the time of the survey, as well as children under schooling age, and
averaging these years over these remaining household members. Employment
sector was constructed as an dummy variable that took on a value of unity if one
of the first two household members (usually the father and/or mother) worked
in a particular sector of the economy in 1995, and null otherwise. These sec-
tors were: Manufacturing (ES1); construction (ES2); agriculture (ES3); forestry
(ES4); transportation (ES5); communications (ES6); trade (ES7); commercial
services (ES8); other production (ES9); science and education (ES10); arts and
culture (ES11); healthcare (ES12); sport and tourism (ES13); finance and credit
(ES14); management and administration (ES15); army and police (ES16); and
other non material activities (ES17). As discussed in the text, political organiza-
tion was constructed with the membership rosters of the Bulgarian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (BCCI) and Confederation of Labor Podkrepa. The in-
dicator took on unity when sectoral organization membership numbers exceeded
4 (out of 84) and 3 (out of 30), respectively, and zero otherwise (these seemingly
arbitrary values belie the significant natural break in the data that determined
the cutoff choices). Household consumption expenditures were constructed in
three steps. First, monthly expenditures on 13 different categories of food and
nonfood consumption goods were collated (these included food items such as ce-
real, fruits and vegetables, and meat and dairy). Second, these were converted
to per capita terms, and then adjusted for seasonality as well as deflated for
regional price differences. Third, since monthly inflation was rapidly changing
over the time period, we converted the values to real terms using monthly CPI
data with January 1995 as the base month. Household total income the sum of
net agricultural income, wage and self employment income, social benefit income
(this includes income from sources such as child allowance and unemployment
insurance), net remittances, other revenue (such as returns from financial assets,
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lottery earnings, and debts), and rents from real estate assets, converted into
real terms.
A.3.2 Indonesian Household Data
In general, we sought to maintain analogous control variables for the Indonesian
data as was employed for the Bulgarian data. However, due to differences in
the two datasets, some of these variables are necessarily different. For the core
variables, the dummy variables for durable asset ownership comprise 11 different
household assets, which include, among other things, livestock (DA4), household
appliances (DA6), jewelery (DA9), and household furniture (DA10). Likewise,
the dummies for agricultural asset ownership and business asset ownership each
comprise 9 different assets that include a tractor (AA1), a plow (AA3), and
a cart (AA13), and motor vehicles (BA3), nonfarm equipment (BA6), and of-
fice equipment (BA7). The dummy variables for household composition were
specified in the same manner as for the Bulgarian data; however, controls for
children were not included. Instead of a measurement for health, we incorpo-
rated dummies for 6 different types of income shocks. These included sickness
(S2), crop loss (S3), and natural disasters (S4), and took on a value of unity if
the shock was experienced by the household in the past 12 months, and null oth-
erwise. Since data on ethnicity were not available for Indonesia, we substituted
this with language: The two dummies corresponded with Behasa Indonesia
(ETH1) and Javanese (ETH2). The geographical district control added dum-
mies to each of the following regions: North Sumatra (DIST1), West Sumatra
(DIST2), South Sumatra (DIST3), Lampung (DIST4), Jakarta (DIST5), West
Java (DIST6), Central Java (DIST7), Yogyakarta (DIST8), East Java (DIST9),
Bali (DIST10), W. Nusa Tenggara (DIST11), South Kalimantan (DIST12), and
South Sulawesi (DIST13). Finally, household size is a discrete measure of the
number of resident household members.
For the constructed variables, we constructed average highest level of house-
hold education in a similar manner to the average household education variable
for Bulgaria, but in this case the data are ordinal. Employment sector was con-
structed as an dummy variable that took on a value of unity if one of the first two
household members (usually the father and/or mother) worked in a particular
sector of the economy in 1993, and null otherwise.43 These sectors were: Sci-
ence and technology (ES1); healthcare (ES2); professionals (ES3); sport (ES4);
administration/management (ES5); clerical (ES6); sales (ES7); service (ES8);
agriculture (ES9); production/manufacturing (ES10); forestry (ES11); chemical
(ES12); food and beverages (ES13); construction (ES14); transport (ES15); and
military (ES16). As discussed in the text, political organization was constructed
using the Castle Group’s Suharto Dependence Index (SDI); this index ranges
43Data for 1997 sectors were not available. According to the IFLS documentation, data for
adult individuals were only collected if they differed from the first IFLS wave. Since these
were not provided for neither IFLS2 nor IFLS3, we worked with IFLS1 data, maintaining
the assumption that any employment sector changes for household members were sufficiently
infrequent.
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from -2 to 5, with corporations more closely affiliated with Suharto being ranked
higher. We considered firms with positive SDI values and allowed the indicator
to take on unity when the sectoral representation exceeded 4 (out of 72), and
zero otherwise (as before, the choice of a cutoff was made based on the natural
break in the data). In addition, for the reason discussed in the text, we also
included the military as a politically-connected group. Household consumption
expenditures were calculated in a similar manner to the Bulgarian data, while
household total income was calculated from the reported annual salaries of the
first 10 individuals in the household, averaged over household size and taken on
a monthly basis, and converted into real terms, accordingly.
A.3.3 International Financial Data
Most of the data were sourced from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) database. The variables specifically implied by the model that we used
are gross domestic product (99B..ZF), government revenue (81...ZF) as a proxy
for taxation, population (99Z..ZF), foreign assets held by banks (21...ZF) as a
proxy for net borrowing, and interest rates. Domestic rates were taken to be the
lending rates (60P..ZF) for the country in question, unless no such data were
available, in which case deposit rates (60L..ZF) were used as a substitute. Inter-
national (risk-free) rates were calculated as the simple average of lending rates
in France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Ad-
ditional technocratic controls include international reserves (.1..SZF) and quota
subscriptions (.2F.SZF). The World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF)
database provided data for external debt (DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS), current ac-
count balance (BN.CAB.XOKA.CD), and debt service as a share of exports of
goods and services (DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS).
We relied on the IMF Annual Reports from 1971 through 2004 for data on
IMF lending via Stand-By (SBA) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrange-
ments. Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) lending was drawn from IMF Staff
Reports. For all these arrangements, we obtained effective and expiration dates
for arrangements, and amounts approved in the financial year corresponding
to the annual report. Crises were classified based on two sources: (a) Caprio,
Gerard & Daniela Klingebiel (2003), “Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Fi-
nancial Crises”. Mimeograph: The World Bank; and (b) Kaminsky, Graciela
L. (2003), “Varieties of Currency Crises”. Mimeograph: George Washington
University. An arrangement was considered to be extended in a crisis period
when it was approved either in the same year t as the crisis, or in the year
t+ 1 following (from either source). However, crises that have their roots in the
public sector (either due to fiscal excess or sovereign debt) were not coded as
crises, since these do not fall into the definition of financial crisis that we have
explored in the theoretical model.
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A.3.4 International Political Data
The construction of the country-level special interest pressure measure was de-
pendent on whether the measure was for a developing or developed country.
For a developing country, we utilized the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics
(GFS) database and obtained government expenditure by the following func-
tions: Defense (82B), Education (82C), Health (82D), Recreational, Cultural,
and Religious (82G), Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (82HB), Min-
ing, Manufacturing, and Construction (82HC), Fuel and Energy (82HD), and
Transportation and Communication (82HI). A Gini index for the distribution
of government expenditure was then calculated, following the equation:
φh,t =
∑Ih
i=1
∑Ih
−i=1 |Gi −G−i|
2I2hGh
.
For computational purposes, this was calculated using the formula in Glasser
(1962):
φh,t =
∑Ih
i=1 (2i− Ih − 1)Gi
I2hGh
,
for G arrayed in ascending order, such that i is the rank of Gi in the sample.
This ranged from 0 (least inequality in special interest pressure) to 1. For
developed countries, we used the Consolidated Banking Statistics compiled by
the BIS to calculate the index of (developed) country lending exposure, which is
the ratio of foreign claims of reporting country banks on an individual country
to the total foreign claims of these reporting banks:
φ−h,t =
Bh,−h,t∑H
h=1Bh,−h,t
.
As discussed in the text, the developed countries were limited to the United
States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The calculation
of φ for the European Union countries of Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom was then calculated as a simple average of countries with available
data. The calculation of φ for all developed countries was calculated in an
analogous fashion.
For political capital, we constructed our measure by taking a simple av-
erage of the Freedom House indices of political freedoms and civil liberties,
for an index that ranges between 0 (greatest political capital at stake) and 7
(least political capital at stake). Although this measure was limited in only
capturing two dimensions, we felt that this was outweighed by the large cov-
erage across time and countries. We also employed the Polity2 variable in the
Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers 2003), although the project’s coverage
of only countries with population sizes greater than 500,000 eliminates a siz-
able number of observations, since small nations constitute a fairly large subset
of participants in IMF lending programs. We obtained the other control vari-
ables from various sources. Political proximity to the U.S. was obtained from
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two sources: The United Nations Roll Call Data, 1946–1985, from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research, and supplemented by
the Dag Hammarskjo¨ld Library Voting Records Database of the United Nations
Bibliographic Information System for the years thereafter. Alternative measures
of special interest pressure were taken from Transparency International’s Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index, from the Internet Center for Corruption Research.
A.4 Notation
α Coefficient of productivity N ih (Nh) Mass of group i (country h)
β Consumer subjective discount rate a Productivity
δ Government discount rate b Private borrowing
 Exogenous productivity shock c Consumption
φ Organized lobbying indicator D Government borrowing
ϕ Distribution of productivity shock f(·) Production function
η Reservation utility of lobbying group g Government disbursement
ι Political capital J Set of lobbying groups
κ Multiplicative constant (cons) k Capital
λ Population organized as lobbies L Lobbying contributions
ν Multiplicative constant (debt) Q (q) (Aggregate) investment
ρ Shock persistence r Interest rate
τ Lump sum tax T Crisis resolution time
ω Weight on lobbying contributions U Lifetime utility
Ξ (ξ) Probability (density) of concession W (V ) Gross (net) group welfare
ζ Lagrangian multiplier Y (y) (Aggregate) output
γ,Γ Regression coefficients (consumption) G Government expenditure
θ,Θ Regression coefficients (lending) B Foreign claims
ϑ Regression coefficients (selection) X HH controls (consumption)
ε Disturbance term (consumption) Y Macro variables (lending)
υ, ζ Disturbance terms (lending) Z Country controls (lending)
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